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I. INTRODUCTION 
Kansas has long been a leader in antitrust legislation.  Stretching back 
to its early populist days,1 Kansas has legislated against antitrust and anti-
competitive behavior since the 1890s.2  However, starting in the 1920s and 
continuing until 2000, Kansas antitrust law development remained largely 
dormant with only occasional forays into statutory development.  In 2000, 
the Governor’s office, recognizing the out-of-date nature of Kansas 
antitrust statutes and responding to external pressures from citizens and 
businesses alike, proposed a wide-ranging amendment that synthesized 
numerous statutory provisions, officially creating the Kansas Restraint of 
Trade Act (KRTA)3 and modernizing Kansas antitrust law. 
Then, in 2012, the Kansas Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. (O’Brien I).4  The court 
overruled the reasonableness standard that was established during the 
timeframe of the Kansas Fair Trade Act.5  In response to O’Brien I, Kansas 
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 1. Populism, KAN. HISTORICAL SOC’Y: KANSAPEDIA (Jan. 2020), https://www.kshs.org 
/kansapedia/populism/15160 [https://perma.cc/LR67-7TBV]. 
 2. 2 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE AND STATUTES 19-1 
(Rocky C. Tsai et al. eds., 5th ed. 2014) [hereinafter STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE]. 
 3. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-158 to -163 (2000). 
 4. 277 P.3d 1062 (Kan. 2012). 
 5. Id. at 1083.  “In 1937, Congress passed the Miller-Tydings Fair Trade Act . . . which made 
vertical price restraints legal if authorized by a fair trade law enacted by a State.”  Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 904–05 (2007).  Kansas enacted its Fair Trade Act 
in 1937, which “specifically permitted contracts controlling resale prices . . . and explicitly authorized 
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legislators filed several bills in the 2012 and 2013 legislative sessions,6 
ultimately resulting in the 2013 KRTA amendments, which included 
revival of the reasonableness standard established during the Fair Trade 
Act period.7  This Article reviews the lead-up to and passage of the KRTA 
in 2000, efforts by litigators to utilize their newfound tools under the 
KRTA, and the legislative and judicial changes to the law following the 
KRTA’s passage.  Part II contains the narrative recollections of Kansas 
Attorney General Derek Schmidt’s participation, as a staff member for the 
governor of Kansas, in the drafting and passage of the KRTA.  Part III 
examines how the KRTA was utilized by government and private actors 
following the enactment of the KRTA.  Part IV examines O’Brien I and 
the flurry of legislation following the decision.  Part V discusses cases 
decided under the 2013 amendments to the KRTA.  Finally, Part VI 
discusses the ongoing role of antitrust enforcement actions. 
II. THE ROAD TO THE KANSAS RESTRAINT OF TRADE ACT: A 
NARRATIVE 
“[T]he Governor is proposing to make our 19th Century antitrust laws 
relevant and useful in our 21st Century economy.”8 
Kansas was the first state in the Union to enact a state-level antitrust 
law of general application.9  As one might expect, it dealt with agricultural 
issues, specifically grain and livestock sales.10  The statute has been 
amended infrequently, but twice in the past two decades.11  The statute was 
enacted in 1889,12 right at the start of the populist era.13  In the 1890s, 
Kansas had two governors who were members of the Populist Party—the 
 
private suits to punish deviation from them.”  O’Brien I, 277 P.3d at 1081.  Suits could be brought 
against both resellers and third-party retailers who had not agreed to the price control.  Id.  “In 1958, 
[the Kansas Supreme Court] struck down the third-party provision as ‘statutory price-fixing by 
compulsion,’ in conflict with the Kansas Constitution.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The Kansas Legislature 
then repealed the entire Act in 1963.  Id.  
 6. See Part IV.  
 7. Heckard v. Park, 188 P.2d 926, 931–32 (Kan. 1948), overruled by O’Brien I, 277 P.3d 1062; 
Okerberg v. Crable, 341 P.2d 966, 971 (Kan. 1959), overruled by O’Brien I, 277 P.3d 1062. 
 8. Hearing on H.B. 2855 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 2000 Reg. Sess. 6 (Kan. 2000) 
[hereinafter Kansas Senate Hearing] (testimony of Derek Schmidt, Legislative Liaison and Special 
Counsel for the Office of the Governor, speaking in support of Kan. H.B. 2855 on Mar. 14, 2000). 
 9. STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 19-1.  
 10. Id. at 19-1 n.1. 
 11. Id. at 19-2. 
 12. Id. at 19-1. 
 13. Populism, supra note 1.  
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People’s Party—and that was not coincidental.14  It was a time of suspicion 
of all things big intruding on the prior norms of the frontier mentality.15  
That suspicion was reflected in public policy of the day, including the early 
antitrust laws.  The Kansas antitrust laws were amended several times 
throughout the 1890s16 and continued development into the trust-busting 
Teddy Roosevelt period of the early twentieth century.17  Then, no lasting 
substantive amendments to Kansas antitrust law occurred for almost 
eighty years.18 
From 1923 to 2000, there was no single, principal antitrust act in 
Kansas.  Instead, there was an eclectic collection of statutes that the revisor 
of statutes had codified in the same general area of the statutes: Chapter 
Fifty of the Kansas Statutes Annotated.19  However, the codification was 
not one seamless act. 
During the 2000 regular session of the Kansas Legislature, I worked 
as Legislative Liaison and Special Counsel to Governor Bill Graves with 
a portfolio that included agriculture issues.  During that time, I remember 
passions ran high in the state’s livestock community as changing business 
practices and market dynamics disrupted this critical sector in the Kansas 
economy.20  Some Kansans felt that mergers and acquisitions, vertical 
integration of the production chain, and other business changes were 
beneficial to some livestock producers but detrimental to others.21  The 
 
 14. Id.; Lorenzo D. Lewelling, KAN. HISTORICAL SOC’Y: KANSAPEDIA (Feb. 2017), https://www 
.kshs.org/kansapedia/lorenzo-d-lewelling/17109 [https://perma.cc/X8TP-GEMR]; John W. Leedy, 
KAN. HISTORICAL SOC’Y: KANSAPEDIA (Feb. 2017), https://www.kshs.org/kansapedia/john-w-
leedy/17110 [https://perma.cc/KVL2-DD35]. 
 15. Populism, supra note 1 (“The group . . . felt that the government’s responsibility was to 
represent farmers rather than big business.  In their view, railroads, banks, and other businesses 
received more support from government.”). 
 16. STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 19-1 to 19-2. 
 17. See LEWIS L. GOULD, THE PRESIDENCY OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT 26–28, 45–50 (2d ed. 
2011) (discussing President Roosevelt’s trust busting and regulation).  
 18. The Kansas Fair Trade Act of 1937 and the Kansas Unfair Practices Act of 1941 were passed 
in this time frame, but both were declared unconstitutional and repealed.  Neither Act has been 
replaced.  See STATE ANTITRUST PRACTICE, supra note 2, at 19-4 n.25.  
 19. See KAN. STAT. ANN. ch. 50 (2000). 
 20. Lee Pitts, Blue Ribbons/Red Faces: Packer Control of NCBA, NO-BULL FOOD NEWS (Mar. 
5, 2000), https://nobull.mikecallicrate.com/2000/03/05/blue-ribbonsred-faces-packer-control-of-ncba 
[https://perma.cc/D5GZ-XSHX].  
 21. Letter from Doran Junk, Exec. Dir., Kan. Cattlemen’s Ass’n, to E. Clay Shaw, Chairman, 
House Subcomm. on Trade (Sept. 2, 2005), in WRITTEN COMMENTS ON TECHNICAL CORRECTIONS 
TO U.S. TRADE LAWS AND MISCELLANEOUS DUTY SUSPENSION BILLS 383 (2005) (“Established in 
1998, the Kansas Cattlemen’s Association represents independent, grass-root cattle producers and 
feedlot operators on marketing and trade issues.  Prior to 1998, independent producers felt as though 
they were being both underrepresented and misrepresented by current organizations.”); MARVIN 
HAYENGA ET AL., MEAT PACKER VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND CONTRACT LINKAGES IN THE BEEF 
AND PORK INDUSTRIES: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 1 (May 22, 2000), 
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passions of the time were reflected in numerous proposals for new 
legislation to regulate various sectors of the livestock marketplace,22 and 
the divisions ran deep within the state’s agriculture community itself over 
the merits or demerits of these sorts of proposals. 
At one point, the Governor asked my thoughts on various legislative 
proposals that were then-pending.  I was fresh off a year as a Kansas 
Assistant Attorney General, where my duties included handling consumer 
protection and antitrust cases.  I had formed two relevant opinions: First, 
the Kansas Consumer Protection Act,23 enacted in the 1970s and 
frequently amended and updated since, was a modern and well-
functioning statute.  Second, the various Kansas antitrust and related 
market-regulation laws, many enacted in the nineteenth century and not 
updated since 1923, were neither modern nor well-functioning.  For 
example, at the time, both the Attorney General and every county attorney 
or district attorney in the state had the authority to bring an enforcement 
action.24  In fact, a Kansas statute made it a crime for local prosecutors not 
to bring an antitrust enforcement action.25  So I recommended to the 
Governor that, rather than layering on new statutes in response to current 
passions, perhaps a better approach would be to overhaul the statutes 
already on the books so they could function effectively. 
The Governor said to make it so. 
That was the origin of the 2000 amendments that resulted in what 
today is called the KRTA.26  I consulted a few key leaders in Kansas 
agriculture to advise them of the Governor’s decision and to seek their 
general thoughts, but there was no bill drafting by group or committee.  
 
http://econ2.econ.iastate.edu/faculty/hayenga/AMIfullreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZHR5-UU4Z] 
(“The livestock and meat industry’s increasing use of production contract, marketing agreement, or 
ownership linkages between beef and pork producers and meat packers has provoked controversy and 
legislation to abolish many of these market linkages.”). 
 22. See, e.g., S.B. 590, 72d Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000) (proposing new regulations on the 
marketing of livestock).  Other legislative proposals included replication of certain provisions of 
federal law, such as the Packers and Stockyards Act, and rewriting the Kansas antitrust law in an 
attempt to impose new standards of conduct for many large businesses operating in Kansas. 
 23. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-623 to -643 (2013). 
 24. See id. § 50-109 (1999) (amended 2000) (“It shall be the duty of the attorney general of the 
state and the county attorneys in their respective counties to diligently prosecute any and all persons 
violating any of the provisions of this act . . . .”).  
 25. See Kansas Senate Hearing, supra note 8, at 3 (testimony of Derek Schmidt, Legislative 
Liaison and Special Counsel for the Office of the Governor, speaking in support of Kan. H.B. 2855 
on Mar. 14, 2000) (“If the attorney general or any county attorney becomes aware of any violation of 
Kansas antitrust law but does not prosecute the violation, the prosecuting attorney forfeits his or her 
office and shall be fine $100 to $1,000.  K.S.A. 50-109.  If it is a county attorney who fails to prosecute, 
the county attorney may also face a jail sentence of at least ten (10) but not more than ninety (90) days.  
K.S.A. 50-118.”).  K.S.A. § 50-109 was later amended to remove this language and K.S.A. § 50-118 
was repealed in its entirety. 
 26. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-158 to -163. 
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Over the course of about two weeks, I worked monk-like in my office up 
to my elbows in the statute books containing chapter fifty of the Kansas 
Statutes Annotated.  I scoured article 1 of the chapter for provisions in 
antitrust and related statutes that seemed in need of deleting, 
supplementing, or modernizing.  I also searched the Kansas Consumer 
Protection Act with an eye toward enforcement tools and other provisions 
that seemed suitable to import into antitrust statutes. 
The result was Kansas House Bill 2855, which was introduced at the 
Governor’s request on February 3, 2000.27  The proposal’s overall purpose 
was to “revise, update and strengthen the antitrust provisions that currently 
are part of Kansas law” in order “to make our 19th Century antitrust laws 
relevant and useful in our twenty-first century economy.”28  We 
considered the bill a “proper, balanced approach” to the “modernization 
of Kansas antitrust law.”29  Its key elements included: 
• “Give[] the [A]ttorney [G]eneral modern investigative powers, 
including administrative subpoena power . . . .”30 
• “Allow[] [c]ourts to impose a [uniform] civil penalty up to 
$5,000.00 for each day a violation . . . occurs,” replacing various 
and eclectic penalties scattered throughout the law.31 
• “Create[] explicit authority for the Attorney General to recover the 
state’s investigation costs in successful litigation.”32 
• “Give[] the [A]ttorney [G]eneral and the [c]ourt a ‘menu’ of 
[options] available for tailoring an appropriate remedy after 
liability is found,” replacing various section-specific remedies, 
some of which (such as forfeiture of corporate charter) purported 
to be mandatory in certain circumstances.33 
• “Permit[] Kansas courts to exercise jurisdiction over nonresident 
entities that violate th[e] statute to the maximum extent allowed 
by the United States Constitution.”34 
• “Concentrate[] all public enforcement power in the [A]ttorney 
 
 27. H.B. 2855, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000); H. JOURNAL, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. 
(Kan. 2000) (discussing Kan. H.B. 2855). 
 28. Hearing on H.B. 2855 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 2000 Reg. Sess. 1 (Kan. 2000) 
(testimony of Derek Schmidt, Legislative Liaison and Special Counsel for the Office of the Governor, 
speaking in support of H.B. 2855 on February 17, 2000). 
 29. Kansas Senate Hearing, supra note 8, at 6 (testimony of Derek Schmidt, Legislative Liaison 
and Special Counsel for the Office of the Governor, speaking in support of Kan. H.B. 2855 on Mar. 
14, 2000). 
 30. Id. at 4–5. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
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[G]eneral rather than in county and district attorneys.”35 
• “Permit[] enforcement actions to be filed in Shawnee County 
District Court.”36 
• “Consolidate[] the “hodgepodge” provisions of current law, as set 
forth in Article 1 of Chapter 50, into a single statute called the 
Kansas Restraint of Trade Act.  This consolidation makes clear 
that all state antitrust actions are governed by a uniform set of 
procedural rules, one set of available remedies, and one uniform 
set of investigative powers.”37 
•  “Make[] the entire statute civil and repeal the miscellaneous 
criminal penalties in the current law.”38 
•  “Put[] all enforcement litigation under the Code of Civil 
Procedure,” rather than the collection of ad hoc procedures 
scattered throughout the law.39 
•  “Repeal[] more than thirty (30) outdated and unused sections of 
law,” which included throwbacks to the populist era imposing 
mandatory fines, jail time and forfeiture of office on law 
enforcement officers, prosecutors and other public officials who 
fail to enforce the antitrust laws.40 
•  “Require[] the [A]ttorney [G]eneral to report annually on her 
antitrust investigations and enforcement activities . . . .”41 
• Make the definition of “person” covered by the law uniform 
throughout the statute.42 
Both the House and Senate were interested in adding a provision to 
extend authority for the Attorney General to review and investigate 
mergers and acquisitions, although the two chambers took different 
approaches.43  A compromise was reached,44 and with that further change, 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. H.B. 2855, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000); S. JOURNAL, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. 
(Kan. 2000).  The House passed H.B. 2855 with amendment proposed by the House Judiciary 
Committee.  The Senate added additional changes to the bill.  The House non-concurred with the 
amendments, but ultimately acceded to the Senate amendments and the conference committee agreed 
to further amendments. 
 44. This compromise is codified at KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-162 (2013). 
2020] KANSAS ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 881 
the legislation passed unanimously.45  On May 5, 2000, the Governor 
signed the bill into law. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, there was great interest among the 
practitioner community in what we had just done.  I’m sure we did a few 
things that, in hindsight, had unintended consequences.  But, since then, 
we’ve seen quite a bit of evolution in how antitrust enforcement is dealt 
with in Kansas—perhaps because of the new statute or maybe just because 
of changed times. 
III. UTILIZING THE NEW TOOLS OF THE KRTA 
Under Kansas law, two sets of players enforce the KRTA.  First, the 
Kansas Attorney General was granted exclusive authority by the KRTA to 
bring a public enforcement action on behalf of the State.46 Second, 
individuals can bring private causes of action.47  This Part examines both 
public actions, brought by the Office of the Kansas Attorney General, and 
private actions brought since the enactment of the KRTA. 
A. Attorney General Enforcement: 2000–2013 
Since the KRTA became law, the Office of the Kansas Attorney 
General has been involved in numerous antitrust matters.  Even the authors 
of this Article were surprised to learn the number of lawsuits and 
settlements that the Attorney General has handled; thus, only a handful 
will be discussed in depth.  The remaining cases will be briefly mentioned 
whenever relevant. 
The majority of matters investigated and enforced by the Attorney 
General settle, whether litigation was filed or not.  This can likely be 
attributed to the grant of prelitigation investigatory authority by the 
KRTA.48  This authority allows the Attorney General to thoroughly 
investigate a matter prior to filing litigation or approaching a noncompliant 
entity with a settlement offer. 
Due to the typically large scope of an antitrust case and 
investigation—as well as the large-scale effect of anticompetitive conduct 
by a nationwide or regional company—the Attorney General pursues 
 
 45. In the Senate, the legislation passed 40–0.  S. JOURNAL, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 
2000).  In the House, the vote was 124–0.  H. JOURNAL, 78th Leg., 2000 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2000).  
 46. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-162.  As discussed above, prior to 2000, the Attorney General and 
every county attorney or district attorney in the state had the authority to bring an enforcement action.  
See supra note 23 and accompanying text.  
 47. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-161. 
 48. Id. §§ 50-153, -159 (2000). 
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antitrust matters almost exclusively in a multistate capacity.49  Nothing 
prohibits the Attorney General from taking action solely on behalf of 
Kansas.  However, unless a company operates exclusively in Kansas or 
the impact is only felt in Kansas, a group of states will generally wish to 
pursue an antitrust matter.  By pooling resources together, a group of states 
can more effectively pursue large companies for their anti-competitive 
behavior.  For the same reason, the states frequently, but not always, will 
coordinate investigations, lawsuits, and settlements with federal agencies 
as well. 
The Attorney General filed and/or settled twenty antitrust matters 
between 2000 and 2013—with the products or services varying from 
women’s shoes to beef to pharmaceuticals and health care products.50  The 
 
 49. See sources cited infra note 50. 
 50. See Civil Litigation Detail: Florida v. Nine West Group, Inc., No. 7:00-CV-01707 (S.D.N.Y. 
2000), ANTITRUST MULTISTATE LITIG. DATABASE, http://app3.naag.org/antitrust/search/viewCivil 
Litigation.php?trans_id=173 [https://perma.cc/7K2C-JNFY] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) [hereinafter 
Nine West Settlement] (out-of-court settlement entered in 2000 regarding women’s shoes); In re 
Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369 (D.D.C. 2002) (pharmaceutical drugs); 
New York v. Salton, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (appliances); Civil Litigation Detail: 
In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., No. 01-cv-11401 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), ANTITRUST MULTISTATE LITIG. 
DATABASE, http://app3.naag.org/antitrust/search/viewCivilLitigation.php?trans_id=190&KT_back 
=1 [https://perma.cc/XWC6-99S7] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) [hereinafter In re Buspirone 
Settlements] (settlement entered on March 7, 2003 regarding pharmaceutical drug Buspar and letter 
agreement settlement of contempt claims entered on December 22, 2008); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust 
Litig., 218 F.R.D. 508, 538 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (pharmaceutical drugs); In re Compact Disc Minimum 
Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197 (D. Me. 2003) (CDs); Ohio v. Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Co., No. 1:02-cv-01080, 2003 WL 21105104, at *4 (D.D.C. May 13, 2003) (pharmaceutical drugs-
Taxol); Ohio v. Hearst Trust, No. 1:05-cv-00384 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2005) (electronic databases); In re 
Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., No. 99MDL1317, 2005 WL 2451960 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 
2005) (pharmaceutical drugs); In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 221 F.R.D. 260 (D. Mass. 2004) 
(pharmaceutical drugs); In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litig., No. 02-2007, 2005 WL 2230314 
(D.N.J. Sept. 13, 2005) (pharmaceutical drugs); Civil Litigation Detail: In the Matter of 
GlaxoSmithKline, PLC (Augmentin), ANTITRUST MULTISTATE LITIG. DATABASE, http://app3.naag 
.org/antitrust/search/viewCivilLitigation.php?trans_id=458&KT_back=1 [https://perma.cc/7DY3 
-WNJR] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) [hereinafter GlaxoSmithKline Settlement] (out-of-court settlement 
entered in 2006 regarding pharmaceutical drug Augmentin); Civil Litigation Detail: Maryland v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 2:06-cv-02398-JP (E.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2006), ANTITRUST 
MULTISTATE LITIG. DATABASE, http://app3.naag.org/antitrust/search/viewCivilLitigation.php?trans 
_id=408&KT_back=1 [https://perma.cc/73FK-3PD4] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) [hereinafter 
SmithKline Beecham Settlement] (settlement entered in 2006 regarding pharmaceutical drug Paxil); 
Civil Litigation Detail: Colorado v. Warner Chilcott, No. 1:05-cv-02182 (D.D.C. 2005), ANTITRUST 
MULTISTATE LITIG. DATABASE, http://app3.naag.org/antitrust/search/viewCivilLitigation.php?trans 
_id=527&KT_back=1 [https://perma.cc/GV4F-NTJE] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) [hereinafter Warner 
Chilcott Settlement] (settlement entered in 2006 regarding pharmaceutical drugs-Ovcon); United 
States v. JBS S.A., No. 108CV05992, 2008 WL 5560009 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 7, 2008) (beef packing 
industry); Civil Litigation Detail: United States v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., No. 08-cv-01878 (D.D.C. 
2008), ANTITRUST MULTISTATE LITIG. DATABASE, http://app3.naag.org/antitrust/search/viewCivil 
Litigation.php?trans_id=612&KT_back=1 [https://perma.cc/4QHV-2FRV] (last visited Apr. 12, 
2020) [hereinafter Verizon Settlement] (settlement reached in 2008 regarding telecommunication 
services); Civil Litigation Detail: Richardson v. Akzo Nobel (In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.), No. 1:09-
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types of conduct ranged from price fixing to anticompetitive mergers.  
Areas of antitrust enforcement change based on what anticompetitive 
enforcement actually occurs, as well as what comes to the attention of 
regulators and prosecutors.  There were a number of matters filed prior to 
2000 that were resolved after 2000, but for the sake of this review, we will 
only discuss matters that were brought in 2000 or later. 
Matters brought during this timeframe can be divided into four major 
categories: pharmaceutical drugs and medical products, consumer goods, 
merger challenges, and government and nonprofit investments.  We will 
briefly highlight each of these areas. 
1. Pharmaceutical Drugs and Medical Products 
Many of the cases brought by the Attorney General in the twenty-first 
century involved pharmaceutical drugs.51  The reasons are multifaceted, 
but generally, anticompetitive activity in the pharmaceutical arena 
adversely affects a large portion of the Kansas population—as well as 
many Kansas governmental agencies, including Medicaid.52  For this 
reason, matters involving pharmaceutical drugs are more likely to come to 
the Attorney General’s attention, from both consumer complaints and 
information received from other governmental entities.  These matters 
affect the population in such a way that the Attorney General feels 
compelled to address the matter through litigation or settlement.  
Additionally, anticompetitive activity in the pharmaceutical drug market 
tends to cause significant monetary damages that can be recovered for the 
state and its citizens.  Eleven of the Attorney General’s enforcement 
actions during this initial timeframe were related to pharmaceutical 
products.53  The drugs at issue treated a variety of conditions, including, 
 
cv-02112-TFH (D.D.C. 2009), ANTITRUST MULTISTATE LITIG. DATABASE, http://app3.naag.org 
/antitrust/search/viewCivilLitigation.php?trans_id=575&KT_back=1%20 [https://perma.cc/JK4R 
-2J8T] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) [hereinafter In re Vitamins II Settlement] (settlement entered in 
2009 regarding vitamin supplements); Florida v. Abbott Labs., No. 08-155, 2010 WL 171692 (D. Del. 
Jan. 8, 2010) (pharmaceutical drugs); Texas v. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc., No. 1:12-cv-03394 (S.D.N.Y. 
filed Apr. 30, 2012) (ebooks); see also infra Section III.A.4 (municipal bonds settlements). 
 51. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. at 369; In re Buspirone 
Settlements, supra note 50; In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 218 F.R.D. at 538; Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co., 2003 WL 21105104, at *4; In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 2005 WL 
2451960; In re Relafen Antitrust Litig., 221 F.R.D. at 260; In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litig., 
2005 WL 2230314; GlaxoSmithKline Settlement, supra note 50; SmithKline Beecham Settlement, 
supra note 50; Warner Chilcott Settlement, supra note 50; Abbott Labs., 2010 WL 171692. 
 52. PATRICIA M. DANZON, WHARTON SCH., UNIV. OF PA., COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST ISSUES 
IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 33 (2014) (“Claims of monopolization are frequently joined by 
states attorneys general, claiming compensation for excessive costs to Medicaid and other state 
programs.”). 
 53. See cases cited supra note 51.  
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inter alia, high blood pressure, seizures, sleeping disorders, anxiety, 
cancer, arthritis, depression, and high cholesterol.54  The number of states 
involved in these matters varied from just three to all fifty.55 
The majority of the pharmaceutical drug actions brought by the 
Attorney General dealt with a generic drug’s delayed entry into the 
market—typically, a “pay-for-delay” allegation.56  “Pay-for-delay” occurs 
when a branded manufacturer pays a generic drug company (or 
companies) not to bring lower-cost alternatives to market.57  The Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) has reported that “pay-for-delay” agreements 
“cost consumers and taxpayers $3.5 billion in higher drug costs every 
year.”58  Other causes of action included market monopolization, sham 
patent litigation, and other fraudulent patent activity.59  Every 
pharmaceutical drug matter pursued by the Attorney General between 
2000 and 2013 resulted in a settlement with the drug manufacturers. 
The one outlier medical case that did not involve pharmaceutical drugs 
was a case involving electronic drug information databases.60  The matter 
started when First Data Bank acquired its competitor, Medi-Span, Inc.61  
The FTC investigated and determined that the combination gave First Data 
Bank an illegal monopoly.62  That investigation resulted in a settlement on 
behalf of nongovernmental consumers that included the divestiture of 
Medi-Span, Inc.63  The states subsequently investigated and reached a 
settlement to recover damages suffered by state governmental 
purchasers.64 
 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  
 56. See, e.g., In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litig., No. 02-2007, 2005 WL 2230314, at *1 
(D.N.J. Sept. 13, 2005) (“The Complaint alleges . . . that Defendants . . . improperly delayed the listing 
of [their] patent in the Orange Book to prolong their monopoly . . . .”). 
 57. Pay-for-Delay: When Drug Companies Agree Not to Compete, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https:// 
www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources/mergers-competition/pay-delay [https://perma.cc/Z8TZ 
-8KXK] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 58. Id. 
 59. See Monopolization Defined, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice 
/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/single-firm-conduct/monopolization-defined [https:// 
perma.cc/P4B5-HS5U] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020); Saami Zain, Antitrust Liability for Maintaining 
Baseless Litigation, 54 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 729, 730 (2014) (discussing the “injury caused by 
anticompetitive sham litigation”); see also cases cited supra note 51.  
 60. See Complaint at 1, Ohio v. Hearst Trust, No. 1:05-CV-00384 (D.D.C. Feb. 25, 2004), 2005 
WL 696707.  
 61. Id.  
 62. Id. at 4–5. 
 63. Id. at 5. 
 64. See Joint Notice of Filing, Ohio v. Hearst Trust, No. 1:05CV00384 (D.D.C. Mar. 2, 2005) 
(providing notice that the parties jointly filed a settlement agreement). 
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2. Consumer Goods 
The Attorney General brought actions regarding consumer goods in 
five matters between 2000 and 2013.  The products involved were 
women’s shoes,65 George Foreman grills,66 compact discs,67 vitamin 
supplements,68 and eBooks.69  Three of the matters involved minimum 
resale price fixing or minimum advertised price policies.70  Each of these 
require a retailer to advertise and/or sell products at a specific price.71  
Failure to comply with the policy could result in a manufacturer refusing 
to supply the product to the retailer or otherwise punishing noncompliance.  
The legal standard in this area has changed and such policies are no longer 
considered to be violations of the law unless they are found to be 
unreasonable restrictions on competition.72  Several of the cases also 
involved agreements for exclusive dealing, agreements to prohibit sales of 
competitor products, or agreements to increase the price of a product to 
comply with a pricing policy.73 
The fourth matter, or more appropriately, matters, were the In re 
Vitamins Antitrust Litigation cases.  There were two separate cases filed.  
The first case (Vitamins I) was filed prior to 2000 in 1999.74  Vitamins I 
addressed both consumer and commercial vitamin supplements, including 
consumer and animal food products.  Vitamins II was related to the first 
litigation, but with different defendants.75  Both matters involved 
allegations of price fixing. 
Vitamins I76 was particularly interesting because it followed criminal 
 
 65. Nine West Settlement, supra note 50.  
 66. New York v. Salton, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 310, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
 67. In re Compact Disc Minimum Advertised Price Antitrust Litig., 216 F.R.D. 197, 200 (D. Me. 
2003). 
 68. In re Vitamins II Settlement, supra note 50. 
 69. United States v. Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 791 F.3d 290 
(2d Cir. June 30, 2015). 
 70. See Salton, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d at 312; In re Compact Disc, 216 F.R.D. at 200; Apple, Inc., 
952 F. Supp. 2d at 647. 
 71. Manufacturer-Imposed Requirements, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov 
/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/dealings-supply-chain/manufacturer-imposed 
[https://perma.cc/3PAZ-3W4X] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020).  
 72. See generally id.  
 73. See, e.g., Salton, Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d at 312 (dealing with exclusive dealing agreements and 
prohibiting sales of competitor products); Apple, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 647 (alleging an agreement 
to increase the price of a product to comply with a pricing policy). 
 74. Civil Litigation Detail: New York v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. (In re Vitamins I), No. 
99.010358 (D.D.C. 1999), ANTITRUST MULTISTATE LITIG. DATABASE, http://app3.naag.org/antitrust 
/search/viewCivilLitigation.php?trans_id=182&KT_back=1 [https://perma.cc/KRP6-DFSK] (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2020) [hereinafter In re Vitamins I Settlement]. 
 75. In re Vitamins II Settlement, supra note 50.  
 76. In re Vitamins I Settlement, supra note 74.  
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guilty pleas obtained by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ),77 it 
included heavy involvement of private parties,78 and it resulted in a Master 
Settlement Agreement79 with the States, the private parties, and the 
defendants.  The settlement agreement was then implemented in state 
court.80  Vitamins II was filed jointly by States and private parties against 
the second group of defendants in the District of Columbia.81  The 
Vitamins II case was resolved by a multistate settlement agreement,82 
similar to the original master settlement of the first case.  However, in the 
second settlement, the States only took responsibility for distribution of 
the consumer portion of the fund, and not the commercial claimant funds.  
The States were tasked with distributing the consumer settlement fund to 
government entities, not for profit enterprises, and/or charitable 
organizations “for the improvement of the health and/or nutrition of the 
citizens of that State and/or the advancement of nutritional, dietary or 
agricultural science.”83 
All of these consumer goods matters were resolved by settlements 
with the defendants, which included cy pres relief.  In many consumer 
goods cases, there is no practical way to identify the affected consumers 
or to verify the consumer purchase.  For example, how many consumers 
hang on to their receipts for a pair of shoes or vitamin enriched bread for 
years?  Thus, much of the money recovered in these matters was 
distributed to not-for-profits and other Kansas entities. 
A fifth consumer goods matter involving eBooks was filed in 2012 
against Apple and five major publishers.84  The majority of this case was 
litigated post-2013, so it will be discussed in Part V. 
 
 77. Plea Agreement, United States v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd., No. 99-CR-184-R (N.D. Tex. 
May 20, 1999), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/atr/legacy/2006/04/10/hoffman.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7D87-Y7JV].  
 78. Todd v. F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. (In re Kan. Vitamins Antitrust Litig.), No. 98-C-4574 
(Dist. Ct. Wyandotte Cty. Oct. 1, 1998). 
 79. Master Settlement Agreement, New York v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. (In re Vitamins 
Antitrust Litig.), No. 1:09-CV-02112 (Oct. 10, 2000), http://app3.naag.org/antitrust/docs/182 
.civil.NY%20v.%20Hoffmann%20LaRoche%20(vitamins).pdf [https://perma.cc/8R7N-66RH] 
(amended Jan. 22, 2001). 
 80. Todd v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. (In re Kan. Vitamins Antitrust Litig.), No. 98-C-4574 
(Dist. Ct. Wyandotte Cty. Apr. 3, 2002). 
 81. In re Vitamins II Settlement, supra note 50. 
 82. Vitamins Antitrust Litigation Multistate Settlement Agreement, Richardson v. Akzo Nobel 
(In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig.), No. 1:09-cv-02112 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 2009), http://app3.naag.org 
/antitrust/docs/575.civil.2009%20Vitamins%20Settlement%20Agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc 
/373L-93QR]. 
 83. Id. at 27. 
 84. Texas v. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc., No. 1:12-cv-03394 (S.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 30, 2012). 
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3. Merger Challenges 
The Attorney General opposed two mergers between the enactment of 
the KRTA and the 2013 amendments.  The industries at issue were beef 
packing85 and telecommunications.86  Although the Attorney General 
reviews many mergers for potential action, only a few are actually 
challenged.  This is both a matter of resources and state interest.  To make 
a decision to challenge a merger, there must be a significant reason to 
invest the time and effort into the case.  It must be of importance to Kansas 
specifically.  All large mergers are reviewed by federal agencies for 
anticompetitive effects87 and typically the action undertaken (or not taken) 
by the federal agency is determined to be the best course of action for 
Kansas.  However, when a merger uniquely affects the citizens or 
economy of Kansas, as in these two merger challenges, the Attorney 
General can choose to file suit or take other action to challenge a merger 
felt to harm Kansas. 
As indicated by the previous discussion of the 2000 amendments to 
the antitrust code, the beef industry is of great importance to the State of 
Kansas.88  In 2008, JBS S.A., the world’s largest beef packer,89 announced 
plans to acquire the fourth largest beef packer in the United States—
National Beef Packing.90  JBS had just completed two other beef packer 
acquisitions immediately prior.91  National Beef Packing operated two 
plants in Kansas—one in Liberal and one in Dodge City—as well as a 
plant in California.92  Kansas had particular concern about the merger 
because of the industry involved and the plant locations in the State.93  The 
 
 85. Complaint at 2, United States v. JBS S.A., No. 1:08-CV-05992 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 20, 2008), 2008 
WL 4919390. 
 86. Complaint at 2, United States v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., No. 1:08-cv-993-EGS (D.D.C. Apr. 
24, 2009), 2009 WL 1380165. 
 87. Merger Review, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/media-resources 
/mergers-and-competition/merger-review [https://perma.cc/C9DL-Q6MA] (last visited Apr. 12, 
2020).  
 88. See supra Part II; see also KAN. DEP’T OF AGRIC., BEEF 2 (2019) (“[B]eef cattle farming and 
ranching has a direct output of approximately $6.3 billion and employs nearly 34,130 Kansans.”).  
 89. Complaint, United States v. JBS S.A., supra note 85, at 2; Emilene Ostlind, The Big Four 
Meatpackers, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Mar. 21, 2011), https://www.hcn.org/issues/43.5/cattlemen 
-struggle-against-giant-meatpackers-and-economic-squeezes/the-big-four-meatpackers-1 [https:// 
perma.cc/UQR4-WN3C]. 
 90. Complaint, United States v. JBS S.A., supra note 85, at 2. 
 91. Id. at 3. 
 92. Id. at 5.  
 93. Id. at 6 (“National’s plants in . . . Kansas are among the largest and most profitable beef 
packing plants in the nation.”).  
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Attorney General, with twelve other states and the DOJ,94 sued to block 
the merger in October of 2008, alleging the merger “would eliminate head-
to-head competition” between the companies, diminish competition in the 
market for the purchase of fed cattle and USDA-graded boxed beef, and 
adversely affect prices cattle producers and ranchers received for their 
cattle, as well as prices consumers paid for beef.95  After several months 
in litigation, the parties abandoned the merger and the case was 
dismissed.96 
The second merger challenge involved Verizon’s acquisition of Alltel 
in 2008.97  The Attorney General, with six other states and the DOJ, filed 
suit alleging the merger of Verizon and Alltel would lessen competition in 
interstate trade and commerce for mobile wireless telecommunications 
services in certain U.S. cellular market areas resulting in higher prices and 
lower quality of service for cellular users.98  This was another case where 
specific Kansas markets were particularly affected and the Attorney 
General felt it was important to file suit.  Seven rural service area cellular 
market areas in Kansas were affected by the transaction.99  The defendants 
ultimately agreed to a settlement that included the divestiture of the 
affected cellular market areas to preserve competition.100 
In a third merger addressed during this timeframe, the Attorney 
General filed comments in the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) review, expressing antitrust concerns regarding the proposed 
merger between AT&T, Inc. and T-Mobile USA and asking that the FCC 
take necessary action to deny the proposed merger.101  The proposed 
merger required both the FCC and the DOJ approval to proceed.  The DOJ 
 
 94. Civil Litigation Detail: United States v. JBA S.A., No. 1:08-CV-05992 (N.D. Ill. 2008), 
ANTITRUST MULTISTATE LITIG. DATABASE, http://app3.naag.org/antitrust/search/viewCivilLitigation 
.php?trans_id=547&KT_back=1 [https://perma.cc/93N2-REFY]. 
 95. Complaint, United States v. JBS S.A., supra note 85, at 3–4. 
 96. Stipulation of Dismissal, United States v. JBS S.A., No. 1:08-CV-05992 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 26, 
2009).  
 97. Complaint at 2, United States v. Verizon Commc’ns Inc., No. 1:08-cv-993 (D.D.C. Oct. 30, 
2008), 2009 WL 1380165.  
 98. Id. at 3.  
 99. Id. at 8–9, 19–20. 
 100. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Requires Divestitures in Verizon’s 
Acquisition of Alltel (Oct. 30, 2008), https://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press_releases/2008 
/238941.htm [https://perma.cc/75K7-JJGK]. 
 101. See AT&T – T-Mobile: Communications from Government Officials, FED. COMMC’NS 
COMM’N, https://www.fcc.gov/att-t-mobile-communications-government-officials [https://perma.cc 
/Y9QF-DDV6] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (listing filed communications regarding the merger, 
including two letters “filed by State Attorney General Derek Schmidt, Kansas” on Nov. 21, 2011); see 
also Brendan Sasso, Kansas Attorney General Urges FCC to Kill AT&T/T-Mobile Deal, THE HILL 
(Nov. 22, 2011, 7:24 PM), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/195147-kansas-attorney-general 
-urges-fcc-to-kill-atat-t-mobile-deal [https://perma.cc/P2AV-SEG3]. 
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brought a lawsuit, joined by seven other states, to block the proposed 
merger.102  Although some states joined the DOJ suit, the Attorney General 
felt that, in this case, comments were the most appropriate method of 
expressing the concerns about the merger.  On November 23, 2011, AT&T 
withdrew its merger application, which the FCC allowed.103  At the same 
time, the FCC released Staff Analysis and Findings, which indicated the 
merger would harm competition in the wireless service industry.104  On 
December 19, 2011, AT&T announced it was abandoning its bid to acquire 
T-Mobile.105 
4. Government and Nonprofit Investments 
The Attorney General entered into settlements with five financial 
institutions and one broker related to anticompetitive conduct in the 
municipal bond derivative investment market between 2010 and 2011.106  
A group of states investigated anticompetitive activities in the municipal 
bond derivatives industry regarding a nationwide scheme to rig bids and 
engage in other anticompetitive conduct that defrauded state agencies, 
municipalities, school districts and not-for-profit entities in their purchase 
of municipal bond investments.107  These government and nonprofit 
organizations issue bonds and reinvest the proceeds until the funds are 
needed or enter into contracts to hedge interest rate risk on bonds.108  The 
States’ investigation revealed fraudulent and conspiratorial conduct 
 
 102. Complaint, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:17-cv-02511 (D.D.C. Nov. 20, 2017), 2017 
WL 5564815. 
 103. Tiffany Hsu & Jim Puzzanghera, AT&T Withdraws T-Mobile Merger Plan From FCC, L.A. 
TIMES (Nov. 25, 2011, 12:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-xpm-2011-nov-25-la-fi-att 
-merger-setback-20111125-story.html [https://perma.cc/NR3G-5ST3]. 
 104. FED. COMMC’NS COMM’N, STAFF ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS, WT DOCKET NO. 11-65, at 111 
(Nov. 29, 2011), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-11-1955A2.pdf (“[T]he staff concludes 
that significant harms to competition are likely to result, primarily in the form of increased prices for 
consumers, reduced incentives for innovation, and decreased consumer choice.”). 
 105. Michael J. De La Merced, AT&T Ends $39 Billion Bid for T-Mobile, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK 
(Dec. 19, 2011, 4:44 PM), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/att-withdraws-39-bid-for 
-t-mobile [https://perma.cc/DYS9-FJLP]. 
 106. Press Release, Derek Schmidt, Kan. Att’y Gen., Municipal Bond Settlements Return Money 
to State, Local Entities (Dec. 28, 2011), https://www.ag.ks.gov/media-center/news-releases/2011 
-news-releases/2011/12/28/attorney-general-schmidt-municipal-bond-settlements-return-money-to-
state-local-entities [https://perma.cc/VCE8-KCED] [hereinafter Press Release, Municipal Bond 
Settlements] (“Six settlements have been reached since the start of this investigation, including five 
this year.”). 
 107. Id.; see also DEREK SCHMIDT, KAN. ATT’Y GEN., CONSUMER PROTECTION DIVISION, 2011 
ANNUAL REPORT 12 (2012), https://ag.ks.gov/docs/documents/2011-consumer-protection-annual 
-report.pdf?sfvrsn=7338c8bd_4 [https://perma.cc/BPZ3-6EM5] (detailing the scope of the alleged 
misconduct).   
 108. Press Release, Municipal Bond Settlements, supra note 106. 
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between individuals at the “financial institutions and certain brokers with 
whom they had working relationships.”109  Such wrongful conduct 
“deprived bond issuers of a competitive, transparent marketplace.”110  As 
a result of this conduct and its effect on the marketplace, “states, local 
governments and not-for-profit entities entered into municipal derivatives 
contracts on less advantageous terms than they would have otherwise, 
thereby adding costs to taxpayers.”111  Identified state governmental and 
not-for-profit organizations affected by the conduct received restitution 
payments from the settlements.112 
B. Notable Private Actions: 2000–2013 
Many private causes of action that address Kansas antitrust law have 
been filed since 2000 in both state and federal court.113  We have limited 
our discussion to cases brought before the Kansas Supreme Court, the 
Kansas Court of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and the U.S. District Court for the District 
of Kansas which specifically discuss the KRTA. 
  
 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id.  
 112. Id. 
 113. See, e.g., Seaboard Corp. v. Marsh Inc., 284 P.3d 314 (Kan. 2012); O’Brien v. Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien I), 277 P.3d 1062 (Kan. 2012); Merriman v. Crompton Corp., 
146 P.3d 162 (Kan. 2006); Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); Idstrom 
v. All. Radiology, P.A., No. 115,099, 2017 WL 129926 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2017); O’Brien v. 
Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien II), No. 108,988, 2014 WL 1362657 (Kan. Ct. App. 
Apr. 4, 2014); Hildyard v. Citizens Med. Ctr., No. 105,468, 2012 WL 4794558 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 5, 
2012); VHC Van Hoecke Contracting, Inc. v. Lennox Indus., Inc., No. 101,024, 2011 WL 2039725 
(Kan. Ct. App. May 20, 2011); Suture Express, Inc. v. Owens & Minor Distribution, Inc., 851 F.3d 
1029 (10th Cir. 2017); Reorganized FLI, Inc.  v. Williams Cos., 410 F. Supp. 3d 1213 (D. Kan. 2019); 
In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & Antitrust Litig., 336 F. Supp. 3d 
1256 (D. Kan. 2018); Digital Ally, Inc. v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 16-2032, 2017 WL 131595 (D. Kan. 
Jan. 12, 2017), aff’d, 720 F. App’x 1023 (Fed. Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 231 (2018); Suture 
Express, Inc. v. Owens & Minor Distribution, Inc., No. 12-2760, 2016 WL 1377342 (D. Kan. Apr. 7, 
2016), aff’d, 851 F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. 2017); Catron v. Colt Energy, Inc., No. 13-4073, 2014 WL 
7246804 (D. Kan. Dec. 17, 2014); Layne Christensen Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp., 836 F. Supp. 2d 1203 
(D. Kan. 2011); Ablulimir v. U-Haul Co. of Kan., No. 11-4014, 2011 WL 2731774 (D. Kan. July 13, 
2011); Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United Egg Producers, No. 11-CV-2063, 2011 WL 
1113546 (D. Kan. Mar. 24, 2011); Schecher v. Purdue Pharma L.P., 317 F. Supp. 2d 1253 (D. Kan. 
2004); Folkers v. Am. Massage Therapy Ass’n, Inc., No. 03-2399, 2004 WL 306913 (D. Kan. Feb. 
10, 2004); Cox v. F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., No. 00 C 1890, 2003 WL 24471996 (Kan. Dist. Ct. 
Oct. 10, 2003); Four B Corp. v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Kan. 2003); 
Bellinder v. Microsoft Corp., No. 00-C-00092, 2001 WL 1397995 (Kan. Dist. Ct. Sept. 7, 2001). 
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1. Kansas Supreme Court 
Three Kansas Supreme Court cases mentioned the KRTA from 2000 
to 2013.  The most recent was Seaboard Corp. v. Marsh Inc.,114 decided 
on August 31, 2012.  The KRTA claim was one of eight brought by an 
insurance client against an insurance broker and companies related to an 
alleged “bid-rigging” scheme.115  The defendants filed a motion to dismiss 
alleging the statute of limitations had run.116  The defendants filed an 
interlocutory appeal after the district court denied their motion to 
dismiss.117  Thus, much of the discussion in both the Kansas Supreme 
Court decision and the underlying decision deals with claim 
preservation.118  The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal and 
noted—similar to the O’Brien I decision a few months earlier119—that 
“statutory analysis must begin with the plain language of the statute.”120  
The Kansas Supreme Court does not speculate about legislative intent 
when statutory language is “plain and unambiguous.”121  The main finding 
of the Kansas Supreme Court decision did not rest on any tenet of the 
KRTA.122   
The district court opinion is much more interesting from an antirust 
perspective.  In discussing the status of claims, the district court noted that 
private actions brought under the KRTA were subject to a three-year 
statute of limitations.123  In the district court case, the defendants also 
asked the court to apply the federal Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly124 
pleading standard to the plaintiff’s claims.125  The court found that because 
the Twombly decision clearly related to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, it did not apply to a Kansas statutory claim brought under the 
Kansas Rules of Civil Procedure.126  Additionally, “neither the Kansas 
 
 114. 284 P.3d 314 (Kan. 2012). 
 115. Id. at 317.  
 116. Id. at 316. 
 117. Id. at 319. 
 118. Id. at 334–36. 
 119. O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien I), 277 P.3d 1062, 1073 (Kan. 
2012). 
 120. Seaboard, 284 P.3d at 324, 337. 
 121. Id. at 324. 
 122. Id. at 316–17.  
 123. Seaboard Corp. v. Marsh Inc., No. 09CV9499, 2010 WL 3054216, at *3 (Kan. Dist. Ct. May 
3, 2010). 
 124. 550 U.S. 544, 570, 555 (2007) (holding that a federal complaint must allege “enough facts to 
state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face” and the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to 
raise a right to relief above the speculative level”). 
 125. Seaboard Corp., 2010 WL 3054216, at *16. 
 126. Id.  
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legislature nor the Kansas Supreme Court” had adopted the standard.127  
Rather, Kansas had a contrary legal standard and until the Kansas Supreme 
Court repealed it, the district court would continue to abide by the 
standard.128 
The second antitrust decision of the Kansas Supreme Court, O’Brien 
I,129 is perhaps the most notable KRTA case of the past two decades.130  
This Article will discuss this case in conjunction with the legislative 
changes that resulted in Part III. 
The final Kansas Supreme Court antitrust decision of the 2000 through 
2013 timeframe—Merriman v. Crompton Corp.—dealt mostly with issues 
of personal jurisdiction over foreign corporations.131  However, the 
underlying cause of action was a price-fixing conspiracy, and the Kansas 
Supreme Court found that a price-fixing conspiracy may be a tortious act 
for purposes of jurisdiction.132  The court came to the decision in part 
“because antitrust violations are generally recognized to be torts,”133 but 
also because “Kansas has a strong interest in protecting the rights of its 
citizens and providing a forum convenient for the redress of wrongs done 
to Kansans.”134  Finally, the Kansas Supreme Court felt it best to leave the 
interpretation of Kansas laws to Kansas courts rather than foreign 
forums.135 
2. Kansas Court of Appeals Decisions 
Kansas Court of Appeals decisions between 2000 and 2013 mostly 
touch only briefly on the KRTA.  The first involved what the court termed 
a “conclusory” pleading of KRTA damages, and the court found the 
antitrust claim was barred by immunity provisions under controlling 
 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.; see also Rector v. Tatham, 196 P.3d 364, 366 (Kan. 2008) (“When a district court has 
granted a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, an appellate court must accept the facts alleged 
by the plaintiff as true, along with any inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom.  The 
appellate court then decides whether those facts and inferences state a claim based on plaintiff’s theory 
or any other possible theory. If so, the dismissal by the district court must be reversed.”) (citation 
omitted)). 
 129. O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien I), 277 P.3d 1062 (Kan. 2012). 
 130. See Michael L. Fessinger, Comment, A Century Behind? The Kansas Supreme Court Opts 
Out of the Rule of Reason in O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 52 WASHBURN L.J. 323, 
324 (2013) (“Following the O’Brien decision, Kansas became the first state whose highest court came 
down against the rule of reason framework since the U.S. Supreme Court applied it to questions of 
vertical price fixing in 2007.”). 
 131. 146 P.3d 162, 166–67 (Kan. 2006). 
 132. Id. at 181. 
 133. Id. at 180. 
 134. Id. at 187. 
 135. Id. 
2020] KANSAS ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 893 
federal law.136  In a second case, the KRTA claims were dismissed on 
summary judgment, and the case continued regarding tortious interference 
with a business relationship; the KRTA dismissal was not appealed.137  
General antitrust principles, including boycott, are discussed in the 
decision, but not the KRTA itself.138  Finally, a KRTA claim was brought 
by a civilly committed sex offender as part of a habeas petition.139  He 
alleged the defendant hospital violated the KRTA because it would only 
allow him to buy materials from the hospital’s own canteen.140  The court 
found the matter did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation to be 
appropriately considered on a habeas petition.141 
3. U.S. District Court of Kansas Decisions 
Between 2000 and 2013, no United States Supreme Court or Tenth 
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals decisions were issued that discussed the 
KRTA.  Five cases discussing the KRTA were decided by the U.S. District 
Court of Kansas during that timeframe. 
Ablulimir v. U-Haul Co. of Kansas began in state court but was 
removed to federal court.142  The plaintiff, who ran a rental business, sued 
U-Haul for failing to renew a contract with her dealership, allegedly 
attempting to run her out of business, and conspiring to open a new 
dealership before terminating her contract.143  The plaintiff generally 
alleged antitrust violations amid her other allegations.  The court found 
that the Kansas Supreme Court had indicated that the question at issue was 
“whether the restraint is reasonable and whether or not the restraint 
contravenes the public welfare.”144  The court noted that the KRTA 
protects competition, not competitors, and dismissed the plaintiff’s 
claim.145 
In Layne Christensen Co. v. Bro-Tech Corp.—a 2011 noncompete 
lawsuit involving a license for a patent to remove arsenic and other 
 
 136. Hildyard v. Citizens Med. Ctr., No. 105,468, 2012 WL 4794558, at *16 (Kan. Ct. App. Oct. 
5, 2012) (“[Defendant] is immune under the [Health Care Quality Improvement Act], even from 
damages for antitrust violations.”). 
 137. VHC Van Hoecke Contracting, Inc. v. Lennox Indus., Inc., No. 101,024, 2011 WL 2039725, 
at *7 (Kan. Ct. App. May 20, 2011). 
 138. Id. at *12–13. 
 139. Merryfield v. Kan. Soc. & Rehab. Servs. (SRS), No. 102,384, 2009 WL 5206252, at *1 (Kan. 
Ct. App. Dec. 31, 2009).  
 140. Id.  
 141. Id. at *4.  
 142. No. 11-4014, 2011 WL 2731774, at *1 (D. Kan. July 13, 2011). 
 143. Id.  
 144. Id. at *6 (citing Heckard v. Park, 188 P.2d 926, 931 (Kan. 1948)). 
 145. Id.  
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contaminants from fluids—the owners and licensor sued the licensee 
alleging patent infringement and breach of contract.146  The licensee 
brought a counterclaim asserting, inter alia, a restraint of trade claim based 
on the noncompete provision of the agreement.147  The plaintiffs sought 
summary judgment on the claim, arguing that the contractual provision 
was not an unreasonable restraint of trade.148  The court noted the lack of 
meaningful interpretation of the statute at the time, reviewed a string of 
reasonableness standard cases from the 1940s and 50s, and noted a Kansas 
Supreme Court case from 1949 in which a contract with a noncompete 
clause was deemed reasonable.149  Based on its review of Kansas Supreme 
Court rulings, the court was convinced that the Kansas Supreme Court 
would reject the antitrust challenge and awarded summary judgment.150 
In Schecher v. Purdue Pharma L.P., the court found that issues of 
Kansas law can be removed from state court and joined in multidistrict 
litigation when allegations are closely related to those in the other 
litigation and substantial questions of federal law are raised by the 
pleadings.151  This facilitates the interest of justice and avoids inconsistent 
results.152  In another case, the court found that a plaintiff’s failure to cite 
a specific provision of the KRTA failed to put the defendant on notice of 
the claim against them, and made an inquiry to determine analogous 
federal statutes impossible, which warranted dismissal of the claim.153 
In 2003, the federal district court held that indirect purchasers have 
“antitrust standing” under the KRTA to sue for full consideration 
damages.154  The court also found indirect purchasers had standing to 
pursue treble damages under another KRTA provision.155  The Kansas 
Supreme Court had not ruled on the matter, so the district court used Smith 
v. Phillip Morris Cos. (an unpublished opinion from the District Court of 
Seward County), the plain language of the KRTA, and the “sparse record 
at this stage of the proceedings” to make its ruling on indirect purchaser 
standing.156  The federal district court adopted the reasoning of the Smith 
decision and found that the Kansas legislature amended state antitrust law 
 
 146. 836 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1210–11 (D. Kan. 2011). 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at 1223. 
 149. Id. at 1224–25.  
 150. Id. at 1223–24. 
 151. 317 F. Supp. 2d 1253, 1261–62 (D. Kan. 2004). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Folkers v. Am. Massage Therapy Ass’n, No. 03-2399, 2004 WL 306913, at *8 (D. Kan. Feb. 
10, 2004). 
 154. Four B Corp. v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 253 F. Supp. 2d 1147, 1151–52 (D. Kan. 2003). 
 155. Id. at 1152. 
 156. Id. at 1151, 1153. 
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in 1985 by placing specific language in the treble damages provision of 
the statute to indicate the State’s intent to allow indirect purchaser actions 
despite the Supreme Court’s 1977 ruling that such actions were disallowed 
under federal antitrust statutes.157  The specific placement of the language 
did not reflect a legislative intent to preclude an indirect purchaser’s 
recovery of full consideration damages; rather the legislature found the 
full consideration provision to be sufficient to allow for indirect purchaser 
recovery.158 
IV. THE O’BRIEN V. LEEGIN DECISION AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE 
CHANGE 
O’Brien v. Leegin is of particular note for Kansas because there were 
actually two Leegin cases—one decided by the U.S. Supreme Court,159 
which did not originate in Kansas, and one decided by the Kansas Supreme 
Court.160  The cases were pursued concurrently—one in federal court on 
issues of federal law and one in state court on issues of state law.  The 
federal case involved a dispute between retailers, while the Kansas case 
was a class action suit.161  Both cases involved the same defendant and 
similar allegations that the defendant’s retail price maintenance program 
was anticompetitive and violative of antitrust laws.162  The U.S. Supreme 
Court decision came down on June 28, 2007,163 and the Sedgwick County 
District Court entered judgment in the state case on July 17, 2008.164  The 
Kansas decision was appealed.165  In the state-law case, the Kansas courts 
were not bound by the U.S. Supreme Court decision because the Kansas 
Supreme Court had long espoused the view that “[w]hile . . . cases 
[interpreting federal antitrust statutes] may be persuasive authority for any 
state court interpreting its antitrust laws, such authority is not binding upon 
any court in Kansas interpreting Kansas antitrust laws.”166 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s Leegin decision found that application of 
the per se rule to vertical minimum resale pricing agreements was 
 
 157. Id. at 1151–52. 
 158. Id. at 1152–53. 
 159. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007). 
 160. O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien I), 277 P.3d 1062 (Kan. 2012). 
 161. Leegin, 551 U.S. 877; O’Brien I, 277 P.3d 1062. 
 162. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 881–84; O’Brien I, 277 P.3d at 1068–69.  
 163. Leegin, 551 U.S. 877. 
 164. O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., No. 04CV1668, 2008 WL 10635349 (Kan. 
Dist. Ct. July 17, 2008), rev’d and remanded, 277 P.3d 1062 (Kan. 2012). 
 165. See O’Brien I, 277 P.3d at 1067 (“We transferred this matter from our Court of Appeals on 
O’Brien’s unopposed motion.”). 
 166. Id. at 1068 (citing Bergstrom v. Noah, 974 P.2d 520, 531 (Kan. 1999)). 
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unwarranted.167  In doing so, the Court overruled Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. 
John D. Park & Sons Co.,168 which had been accepted precedent for almost 
a century.  The Kansas Supreme Court, ruling five years later, found to the 
contrary.  The Kansas Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument 
that the court should apply the same “rule of reason” analysis the U.S. 
Supreme Court applied in Leegin—a case involving “at least some of the 
same pricing practices at issue here.”169  Instead, the Kansas Supreme 
Court found that “[n]either K.S.A. § 50-101 nor K.S.A. § 50-112 mentions 
reasonableness or a rule of reason.”170 
The Attorney General submitted an amicus brief in the matter arguing 
that the legislature had declared retail price maintenance against public 
policy, federal precedents applying the rule of reason were inapplicable 
and unpersuasive given the differences between federal and state law, and 
the bright line rule laid out by the legislature was more practically 
beneficial than a rule of reason, giving clarity to market participants.171  
The Kansas Supreme Court found the statutory language of the KRTA 
drew a bright line rule, and federal antitrust rulings compelled nothing of 
them.172  The court instead considered the legislative and case law history 
of antitrust in Kansas,173 finding that neither prior cases nor the clear 
language of the statute justified reading a “reasonableness rubric” into a 
price-fixing arrangement or the KRTA.174  The Kansas Supreme Court’s 
decision reaffirmed that despite the existence of federal antitrust statutes, 
such as the Sherman Act, and much case law interpreting such federal law, 
“antitrust law has traditionally been the province of the states.”175  The 
court ultimately found that “[b]ecause this state court case arises under the 
KRTA rather than federal law, the rule of reason does not apply.”176  
Rather, the plain language of Kansas statutes governed.  The case had been 
 
 167. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 882.  
 168. 220 U.S. 373 (1911). 
 169. O’Brien I, 277 P.3d at 1078–79. 
 170. Id. 
 171. See Brief for the States of New York et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Leegin 
Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (Feb. 26, 2007) (No. 06-480). 
 172. O’Brien I, 277 P.3d at 1079 (“[F]ederal precedents interpreting, construing, and applying 
federal statutes have little or no precedential weight when the task is interpretation and application of 
a clear and dissimilar Kansas statute.”). 
 173. Id. at 1079–82. 
 174. Id. at 1082 (“Careful examination of Heckard and Okerberg demonstrates that the 
‘reasonableness’ rubric they instituted had and has nothing to do with evaluation of an alleged price-
fixing arrangement . . . .  [A] more basic reason not to apply the reasonableness rubric . . . [is that] we 
are loathe to read unwritten elements into otherwise clear legislative language.”). 
 175. Id. at 1067–68; see also McShares, Inc. v. Barry, 970 P.2d 1005, 1012 (Kan. 1998) 
(“Congress intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, not displace, state antitrust remedies.” 
(citation omitted)). 
 176. O’Brien I, 277 P.3d at 1084. 
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decided on summary judgment at the lower court and other issues—such 
as class certification—remained, so the case was reversed and remanded 
to the lower court for further proceedings.177 
Immediately following the Kansas Supreme Court decision in O’Brien 
I, opponents of the decision sought a statutory change to the KRTA.  The 
first bill proposing to amend the KRTA was introduced May 10, 2012—
six days after the court’s decision.178  House Bill 2797 was introduced to 
“correct the interpretation of the Kansas restraint of trade act, K.S.A. § 50-
101 through 50-162, and amendments thereto, made in O’Brien v. Leegin 
Creative Leather Products, Inc.”179  The proposed bill contained a 
provision which stated an “arrangement, contract, agreement, trust, 
understanding or combination” was not a trust (and therefore unlawful) if 
it “would be deemed a reasonable restraint of trade or commerce under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, as construed and interpreted 
by the federal courts.”180  The proposed bill also prohibited antitrust class 
actions and applied retroactively to all pending and future litigation.181 
Numerous individuals, businesses, and interest groups submitted 
written testimony to the House Judiciary Committee which held a hearing 
on the bill on May 11, 2012.182  Opinions were mixed and even parties 
 
 177. Id. at 1067, 1072.  The matter was appealed again post-remand to the Kansas Court of 
Appeals, which noted in its opinion:  
In direct response to the Kansas Supreme Court’s earlier decision in this case, the Kansas 
Legislature made significant amendments to the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act, effective 
April 18, 2013.  That statute now allows for “reasonable restraint of trade” and has declared 
that its provisions will be “construed in harmony” with the United States Supreme Court’s 
antitrust decisions.  In addition, the legislature repealed K.S.A. 50-108 and K.S.A. 50-115, 
the statutes that provided for actual damages and what are called full-consideration 
damages . . . .  And the legislature declared that its new provision allowing reasonable 
restraint of trade should apply retroactively except for cases, like this one . . . .   
  The end result is that most of O’Brien’s precedential value is limited to this case and 
any other case that was already pending before April 18, 2013.  Accordingly, our opinion 
in this case will have very limited precedential value going forward regarding issues arising 
under the Kansas Restraint of Trade Act.  
O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien II), No. 108,988, 2014 WL 1362657, at *5 
(Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2014) (internal citations omitted). 
 178. H.B. 2797, 84th Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012). 
 179. Id.  
 180. Id. § 1(a).  
 181. Id. § 1 (b)–(c). 
 182. Kansas Restraint of Trade Act: Hearing on H.B. 2797 Before the H. Judiciary Comm., 84th 
Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2012) (statements of Dale Rodman, Secretary of Agriculture, Kansas 
Department of Agriculture; Professor Michael Hoeflich, University of Kansas School of Law; the 
National Cattleman’s Beef Association; Jeffrey Jordon, the Association of Ethanol Processors; the 
Kansas Grain & Feed Association; the Kansas Agribusiness Retailers Association; the Kansas 
Cooperative Council; the Kansas Chamber; Patrick Stueve of Stueve, Siegel, & Hanson, LLP; Rex 
Sharp of Gunderson, Sharp & Walke, LLP; the Kansas Association for Justice; former Attorney 
General Steve Six; and Deborah B. McIlhenny of Hutton & Hutton, LLC). 
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who felt the law should be amended did not necessarily feel Kansas House 
Bill 2797 was the proper solution.183  The bill ultimately died in 
committee.184 
In the following legislative session in 2013, six bills were proposed to 
change the KRTA.185  Two of the bills proposed to repeal the KRTA 
completely.  Those two bills, introduced by different House Committees, 
were identical; both died in committee.186  Five of the six bills were 
introduced in the House or Senate Judiciary Committees. 
Four bills proposing amendment to KRTA were introduced: Kansas 
Senate Bill 123, Kansas Senate Bill 124, Kansas House Bill 2224, and 
Kansas House Bill 2275.  Kansas Senate Bill 123 and Kansas House Bill 
2275 were identical.  Kansas Senate Bill 123, Kansas House Bill 2275 and 
Kansas House Bill 2224 proposed to amend existing statutes K.S.A. § 50-
101 and § 50-112.  Kansas Senate Bill 124 proposed amending K.S.A. § 
50-101, § 50-112, and § 50-161.  The goal of all four amendment proposals 
was to replace the “per se” standard with a “reasonableness” standard.187  
Despite this commonality, the four bills differed in both language and 
substance. 
Kansas Senate Bill 123, Kansas House Bill 2275, and Kansas Senate 
Bill 124 added a four-factor test to determine whether a trust is a 
“reasonable restraint of trade.”  The test was identical in each bill.188  The 
test was similar, but not identical, to the federal test set out by the U.S. 
Supreme Court.189  Kansas House Bill 2224 did not include the new four-
factor test for reasonableness, and the test was struck from Kansas Senate 
Bill 124 in the legislative process.190  Each bill exempted certain entities 
 
 183. For instance, Eric Stafford, Senior Director of Governmental Affairs for the Kansas Chamber, 
stated that “we simply need more time before we can support HB 2797 to make sure there are no 
unintended consequences.”  Id. 
 184. See HB 2797, KAN. LEG., http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2012/b2011_12/measures/hb2797/ 
[https://perma.cc/3PZV-XZPL] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 185. S.B. 123, 85th Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013); S.B. 124, 85th Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 
2013); H.B. 2224, 85th Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013); H.B. 2275, 85th Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. 
(Kan. 2013); H.B. 2258, 85th Leg., 2013 Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013); S.B. 2225, 85th Leg., 2013 Reg. 
Sess. (Kan. 2013). 
 186. Kan. S.B. 2225 § 3; Kan. H.B. 2258 § 3.  
 187. Kan. S.B. 123 § 1(b)(1); Kan. S.B. 124 § 1(b)(1); Kan. H.B. 2224 § 1(b)(1); Kan. H.B. 2275 
§ 1(b)(1). 
 188. Kan. S.B. 124 § 1(b)(2); Kan. H.B. 2275 § 1(b)(2); Kan. S.B. 123 § 1(b)(2). 
 189. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885–86 (2007) 
(“Appropriate factors to take into account include ‘specific information about the relevant business’ 
and ‘the restraint’s history, nature, and effect.’  Whether the businesses involved have market power 
is a further, significant consideration.” (citations omitted)). 
 190. Kan. S.B. 124 (as amended by the Senate Judiciary Committee).  Prior versions of S.B. 124 
included a list of factors that Kansas courts would need to consider when making the reasonableness 
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from the prohibitions of the KRTA.  A select few entities were exempted 
in all proposed bills, but others were only proposed in one or two of the 
bills.191  Kansas Senate Bill 124 added a section amending existing statute 
K.S.A. § 50-161.192  The new section limited the allowable damages to be 
sought under the KRTA to either actual damages or those damages 
allowed by existing statute K.S.A. § 50-115.193  This addition was not 
present in Kansas Senate Bill 123 or Kansas House Bill 2224.  Ultimately, 
Kansas Senate Bill 124 took the day; it was passed by both chambers and 
was signed by the Governor on April 16, 2013.194 
We won’t take a deep dive into the 2013 statutory change.  Several 
previous articles have explored the legislative and policy changes of 
Kansas Senate Bill 124.195  But several key changes are worth noting.  The 
2013 amendment added a federal harmonization provision with 
exemptions for attorney general enforcement, indirect purchaser suits, and 
intrastate commerce.196  The retroactive application of the statute is 
discussed further in Part V.197  Several areas were explicitly excluded from 
the jurisdiction of the KRTA.198  Ironically, one exclusion was any 
agreement governed by the provisions of the Packers and Stockyards 
Act.199 
Finally, the amendment changed the standard of review under Kansas 
antitrust law to a reasonableness standard.200  It is important to note that 
despite including a federal harmonization provision in the KRTA, the 
amendment did not adopt the federal rule of reason standard.  The Kansas 
 
determination.  The final version eliminated these factors and instead directed courts to consider “all 
of the facts and circumstances of the particular case.”  Kan. S.B. 124 § 1(c). 
 191. For example, Kansas Senate Bill 123 and Kansas House Bill 2275 exempted group 
purchasing organizations or cooperatives “engaged in coordinated purchasing activities designed to 
obtain lower prices or increase efficiencies for its members so long as it does not possess monopoly 
power.”  Kansas House Bill2224 and Kansas Senate Bill 124 did not contain this exemption.  
 192. Kan. S.B. 124 § 4(a)–(c). 
 193. Id. § 4(b). 
 194. See Bills & Laws, KAN. LEG., http://www.kslegislature.org/li_2014/b2013_14/measures 
/sb124/ [https://perma.cc/US38-DDHV] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
 195. See, e.g., Joshua A. Ney, The Revised KRTA: O’Brien and the Legislative Response, 53 
WASHBURN L.J. 265, 286–93 (2014); Fessinger, supra note 130, at 353 (discussing the Kansas 
Legislature’s response to O’Brien I). 
 196. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-163(b), (d) (2013). 
 197. See infra Part V. 
 198. Id. § 50-163(e). 
 199. See id. § 50-163(e)(5). 
 200. Id. § 50-163(c); see also Melissa Lipman, New Kansas Law Undoes Antitrust Ruling on 
Resale Pricing, LAW360 (Apr. 18, 2013, 10:17 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/433994/print 
?section=competition [https://perma.cc/YTA2-576X] (“Now Kansas courts will have to consider 
whether arrangements that ‘are not intended to unreasonably restrain trade or commerce and do not 
contravene public [welfare]’ are illegal ‘in view of all of the facts and circumstances of the particular 
case.’”). 
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Legislature chose not to establish a test similar to that established by the 
U.S. Supreme Court, instead leaving the standard vaguely defined as 
“reasonableness” based on a review of the facts and circumstances.201  
Additionally, to the extent U.S. Supreme Court judicial interpretations are 
in conflict with or inconsistent with the reasonableness provision of the 
Kansas law, the Kansas reasonableness provision would control.202  The 
provision returned Kansas law to the reasonableness standard found in 
earlier Kansas case law.  All Kansas Supreme Court and Court of Appeals 
decisions since the amendment of the statute have applied pre-amendment 
statutory interpretation to the matter, as they were instituted prior to the 
statutory change.  The Kansas Court of Appeals noted that the changes 
included: 
(1) The repeal of the full-consideration damages provision in K.S.A. 50-
115, which allowed a successful plaintiff to recover the full consideration 
paid for goods “controlled in price by such combination” . . . ; (2) a 
declaration that provisions of the KRTA shall be “construed in harmony” 
with the United States Supreme Court’s interpretations of federal 
antitrust law; and (3) permitting a rule-of-reason analysis by an explicit 
allowance for “reasonable restraint[s] of trade or commerce.”203 
V. KANSAS ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT SINCE THE 2013 AMENDMENT 
OF THE KRTA 
A. Attorney General Antitrust Enforcement Since 2013 
Antitrust cases in recent years have been increasingly complex.  One 
aspect of this involves the introduction of eDiscovery and the need to cull 
millions of electronic documents, which has affected the size and timing 
of litigation.204  Additionally, in recent years, more Defendants have 
fought Attorney General claims and refused, at least initially, to settle than 
in the past.  The Attorney General has pursued matters in the same 
categories as before the 2013 amendments to the KRTA: pharmaceutical 
drugs, consumer goods, government and nonprofit investments, and 
mergers, with the addition of technological services. 
 
 201. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-163(c). 
 202. Id. § 50-163(b) (“If such judicial interpretations [by the United States Supreme Court] are in 
conflict with or inconsistent with the express [reasonableness] provisions of subsection (c), the 
provisions of subsection (c) shall control.”). 
 203. Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644, 652 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014). 
 204. Steven Bennett, E-Discovery: Reasonable Search, Proportionality, Cooperation, and 
Advancing Technology, 30 J. MARSHALL J. INFO. TECH. & PRIVACY L. 433, 445–48 (2014) 
(highlighting new challenges that come with advancing technology with respect to eDiscovery). 
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1. Pharmaceutical Drugs 
The Attorney General brought four pharmaceutical drug lawsuits 
between 2013 and 2019.  Three of them are still in litigation at the time of 
this writing.  The first matter, New York v. Cephalon, Inc., involved a 
company that engaged in anticompetitive conduct to keep a generic 
competitor off the market.205  The Attorney General, with forty-eight other 
states and the District of Columbia, negotiated a settlement with Cephalon 
and its co-conspirators prior to filing suit.206  The FTC had settled with the 
company prior to the States’ suit and set up an escrow fund, from which 
the States were able to recover.207  Cephalon, the brand drug company, had 
filed for a fraudulent patent to preserve its patented drug monopoly that 
was reaching expiration208––a patent that a court later deemed to be invalid 
and unenforceable.209  Prior to the court finding, Cephalon filed patent 
infringement cases to keep generic competitors from introducing a generic 
alternative.210  When Cephalon brought suit against potential competitors, 
it would settle those suits by paying its potential competitors to delay their 
sale of the generic drug.211  That conduct delayed generic versions of the 
drug from entering the market for several years, causing consumers and 
governmental health providers to pay higher prices for the branded version 
of the drug.212 
The second pharmaceutical matter the Attorney General is pursuing is 
still in litigation at the time of this writing.  In 2016, the Attorney General 
and thirty-four other States and the District of Columbia filed suit alleging 
the makers of Suboxone, an opioid addiction treatment drug, had 
conspired to block generic competition by switching the drug from a tablet 
 
 205. Complaint at 1–2, New York v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 16-cv-4234 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2016). 
 206. Order Granting Final Approval for Settlement at 1, New York v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 16-cv-
4234 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2017) (“Plaintiff States and Cephalon, Inc. . . . entered into a Settlement 
Agreement dated July 28, 2016.”). 
 207. See Stipulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Equitable Monetary Relief at 1, FTC v. 
Cephalon, 2:08-cv-2141 (E.D. Pa. June 17, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases 
/150617cephalonstip.pdf; Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Settlement of Cephalon Pay for 
Delay Case Ensures $1.2 Billion in Ill-Gotten Gains Relinquished; Refunds Will Go To Purchasers 
Affected By Anticompetitive Tactics (May 28, 2015, 11:00 AM), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events 
/press-releases/2015/05/ftc-settlement-cephalon-pay-delay-case-ensures-12-billion-ill [https://perma 
.cc/74XR-EEW4]. 
 208. Complaint, New York v. Cephalon, Inc., supra note 205, at 13–16. 
 209. Apotex Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 06-cv-2768, 2011 WL 6090696, at *1, (E.D. Pa. Oct. 31, 
2011) (finding Cephalon’s Formulation Patent invalid). 
 210. Complaint, New York v. Cephalon, Inc., supra note 205, at 16–18. 
 211. Id. at 19–24. 
 212. See id. 
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to a dissolving film in a scheme called “product hopping.”213  This is 
accomplished by making small formulation changes to the product so that 
pharmacies cannot automatically substitute a generic drug for the new 
version of the brand.214  The suit also alleges that the Defendant fabricated 
false safety concerns and manipulated the Food and Drug Administration 
approval process.215  Since the complaint was filed, additional states have 
joined the litigation.216  The original complaint was filed against four 
Defendants, but the court dismissed claims against Reckitt Benckiser 
Healthcare (UK) Ltd. on October 17, 2017, and dismissed claims against 
Indivior PLC on October 25, 2017.217  Litigation continues against 
Indivior, Inc., and MonoSol Rx, LLC. 
The DOJ has taken criminal action against two related companies, 
indicting Indivior, Inc., a defendant in the case, and Indivior PLC for 
“engaging in an illicit nationwide scheme to increase prescriptions of 
Suboxone Film.”218  The DOJ also settled a case against Indivior’s former 
parent company, Reckitt Benckiser Group plc, which the States did not 
sue, to resolve potential criminal and civil liability related to a federal 
investigation of the marketing of Suboxone.219  There is also an ongoing 
concurrent private class action filed in the same court as the States’ case.220  
Because the matter is still pending, nothing further can be said about the 
case at this time. 
The final two pharmaceutical cases being pursued by the Attorney 
 
 213. Wisconsin v. Indivior, Inc. (In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig.), No. 16-cv-5703, 2017 WL 
4810801, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2017). 
 214. Id.; Complaint at 11–18, Wisconsin v. Indivior, Inc. (In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig.), No. 
16-cv-5703 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 15, 2013), 2017 WL 4810801.  
 215. Indivior, 2017 WL 481080, at *1 (alleging that Indivior “refus[ed] to participate in a joint 
REMS safety program and fil[ed] a baseless citizen petition”). 
 216. DEREK SCHMIDT, KAN. ATT’Y GEN., 2016 CONSUMER PROTECTION & ANTITRUST DIVISION 
ANNUAL REPORT 17 (2017), https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/documents/2016-consumer 
-protection-annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn=dfc0d51a_4 [https://perma.cc/Y8BG-QEEU] (“An amended 
complaint was filed on November 16, 2016, which added additional state plaintiffs, bringing the total 
number of states to 42.”); see also Dan Packel, 6 More States Join Suboxone Product-Hopping 
Lawsuit, LAW360 (Nov. 18, 2016, 1:52 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/864208/6-more 
-states-join-suboxone-product-hopping-lawsuit. 
 217. See Order at 1, Wisconsin v. Indivior, Inc. (In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig.), No. 16-5703, 
2017 WL 4810801 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 2017); Memorandum Opinion at 1, Wisconsin v. Indivior, Inc. 
(In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig.), No. 16-5703, 2017 WL 4810801 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2017). 
 218. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Indivior Inc. Indicted for Fraudulently Marketing 
Prescription Opioid (Apr. 9, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/indivior-inc-indicted-fraudulently 
-marketing-prescription-opioid [https://perma.cc/U4PJ-VPSG]. 
 219. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Obtains $1.4 Billion from Reckitt 
Benckiser Group in Largest Recovery in a Case Concerning an Opioid Drug in United States History 
(July 11, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-obtains-14-billion-reckitt 
-benckiser-group-largest-recovery-case [https://perma.cc/J6NH-BQ2C]. 
 220. See In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., No. 2:13-md-02445, 2019 WL 4735520, at *1 (E.D. Pa. 
Sept. 27, 2019). 
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General are lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers.  The first was 
filed in 2016 against six generic drug companies alleging they had entered 
into a longstanding illegal conspiracy to unreasonably restrain trade, 
artificially inflate and manipulate prices and reduce competition in the 
United States for two drugs: Doxycycline Hyclate Delayed Release, an 
antibiotic, and Glyburide, an oral diabetes medication.221  The price of the 
drugs was allegedly manipulated through price-fixing and price 
maintenance, market allocation, and similar anticompetitive acts.222  The 
complaint alleges that the conspiracy was conceived and carried out by 
senior drug company executives and their marketing and sales executives, 
who coordinated through meetings with their competitors at industry trade 
shows and other events, as well as through email, phone and messaging.223 
Since that initial filing, the complaint has been amended to include 
forty-seven states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico, and the 
litigation was transferred through the multidistrict litigation process to the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania.224  The complaint has been expanded to 
include fourteen additional defendants and thirteen additional drugs about 
which the companies are alleged to have entered into conspiracies.225  
Litigation is still pending. 
In March 2017, cooperation and settlement agreements were reached 
with two former executives of Heritage Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Jeffrey 
Glazer,226 the company’s former chairman and chief executive officer, and 
Jason Malek,227 the former president of Heritage.  Kansas has since entered 
into similar agreements with several more executives of other companies. 
In May of 2019, the Attorney General and forty-six other state 
attorneys general filed a second complaint against eighteen generic 
pharmaceutical companies and certain company executives, alleging an 
overarching conspiracy to artificially inflate and manipulate prices and 
 
 221. Complaint at 2, Connecticut v. Aurobindo Pharma USA, Inc., No. 3:16 cv-02056 (D. Conn. 
Dec. 15, 2016), 2016 WL 7242624. 
 222. Id. at 4–5.  
 223. Id. 
 224. See generally Plaintiff States’ Consolidated Amended Complaint, Connecticut v. Aurobindo 
Pharma USA, Inc., No. 2:17-cv-03768 (E.D. Pa. filed Dec. 14, 2016); In re Generic Pharm. Pricing 
Antitrust Litig., 315 F. Supp. 3d 848 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
 225. See Plaintiff States’ Consolidated Amended Complaint, Connecticut v. Aurobindo Pharma 
USA, Inc., supra note 224, at 1–2. 
 226. State Attorneys General Settlement Agreement with Jeffery Glazer (Mar. 17, 2017), https:// 
portal.ct.gov/-/media/AG/Press_Releases/2017/20170512GenericDrugsGlazerSettlementAgreement 
PDF.PDF?la=en [https://perma.cc/4PHW-P6TZ]. 
 227. State Attorneys General Settlement Agreement with Jason Malek (Mar. 21, 2017), https:// 
portal.ct.gov/-/media/AG/Press_Releases/2017/20170512GenericDrugsMalekSettlementAgreement 
PDF.PDF?la=en [https://perma.cc/SS2J-HATZ]. 
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reduce competition for more than 100 additional generic drugs.228  These 
drugs treat various conditions including basic infections, diabetes, cancer, 
epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, HIV, and ADHD, as well as including 
antidepressants, contraceptives, and anti-inflammatory drugs.229  An 
amended complaint was filed in November 2019, adding additional 
plaintiff states.230  This case is also still pending at the time of this writing. 
2. Consumer Goods 
In 2012, Kansas joined a second amended complaint against Apple 
and five major publishers.231  The lawsuit alleged a hub and spoke 
conspiracy against Apple and five major publishers—that the publishers 
had conspired with other book publishers and Apple to artificially raise 
prices by imposing a new distribution model under which the publishers 
set the prices for bestsellers at $12.99 and $14.99.232  When Apple entered 
the eBook market, the publishers and Apple agreed to adopt an agency 
distribution model which relied on contract terms which forced eBook 
sellers to sell the products at the same price.233  Because the publishers 
agreed to use the same prices, retail price competition was eliminated.  The 
States alleged that Apple orchestrated the conspiracy with the 
publishers.234  The States sued only three of the conspirators in the 
 
 228. Complaint at 1–3, Connecticut v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 3:19-cv-00710 (D. Conn. May 
10, 2019). 
 229. Id. at 25.  
 230. See generally Amended Complaint, Connecticut v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., No. 2:19-cv-
02407 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2019). 
 231. See Second Amended Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Civil Penalties & As Parens Patriae 
on Behalf of Consumers at 2, Texas v. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc., No. 1:12-cv-03394 (S.D.N.Y. May 
17, 2012).  Kansas and seventeen other states joined the litigation a few months after the original suit 
was filed.  In the original suit, there were sixteen plaintiffs—fifteen states and Puerto Rico.  See 
Complaint for Injunctive Relief, Civil Penalties & As Parens Patriae on Behalf of Consumers at 2–3, 
Texas v. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc., No. 1:12-cv-03394 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 11, 2012) [hereinafter Initial 
Complaint, Texas v. Penguin Grp.].  The Attorney General joined the Ebook litigation in 2012, prior 
to the 2013 amendments to the KRTA, but the litigation continued until 2016, so we have included 
the discussion in this Part. 
 232. Initial Complaint, Texas v. Penguin Grp., supra note 231, at 16.  A hub and spoke conspiracy 
is one in which: 
[T]he “hub,” coordinates an agreement among competitors at a different level, the 
“spokes.”  These arrangements consist of both vertical agreements between the hub and 
each spoke and a horizontal agreement among the spokes “to adhere to the [hub’s] terms,” 
often because the spokes “would not have gone along with [the vertical agreements] except 
on the understanding that the other [spokes] were agreeing to the same thing.” 
United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 314 (2d Cir. 2015) (alterations in original) (internal 
citations omitted) (quoting 6 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1402c 
(3d ed. 2010)). 
 233. Initial Complaint, Texas v. Penguin Grp., supra note 231, at 16–17. 
 234. See id.  
2020] KANSAS ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 905 
litigation because the other three had agreed to settle with the DOJ prior 
to the filing, and all three agreed to settle with the States prior to the May 
2012 filing.235 
As the case progressed, the divergences between federal and state law 
were discussed and briefed.  The court ordered the States to file 
supplemental briefing regarding their state law claims, providing copies of 
the relevant state laws, case law enumerating the elements of state law 
claims, and “authority describing the extent to which any finding under 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act might affect those state law claims.”236  The 
court then suggested at the Final Pretrial Conference that the States 
voluntarily dismiss any state law claims that were not congruent with 
Section I of the Sherman Act. 
The 2013 amendments to the KRTA had added provisions which 
harmonized federal and state law: “the Kansas restraint of trade act shall 
be construed in harmony with ruling judicial interpretations of federal 
antitrust law by the United States Supreme Court.”237  However, the 
lawsuit was filed prior to the amendment of the Act.  The amendments to 
the Act applied retroactively except “causes of action that were pending in 
any court before the effective date of this act, shall not be abated.”238  Thus, 
there was no statutory provision or case law which indicated the KRTA 
could be interpreted congruently with the federal Sherman Act.  Quite the 
contrary, Kansas courts had on multiple occasions indicated that federal 
law was merely persuasive authority in interpreting Kansas antitrust 
law.239  To facilitate moving the litigation forward and avoid a potentially 
adverse ruling, the State agreed to dismiss the claims as the court 
requested; Kansas was one of thirteen states whose state law claims were 
dismissed.  Kansas was able to proceed under federal law claims, and 
ultimately, the dismissal had no adverse impact on the outcome of the 
 
 235. Django Gold, 17 States Seek To Join E-Book Price-Fixing Suit Against Apple, LAW360 (May 
11, 2012, 3:08 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/339616/17-states-seek-to-join-e-book-price 
-fixing-suit-against-apple (“[T]he DOJ last month opened a civil suit against Apple and the five 
publishers, with Hachette, HarperCollins and Simon & Schuster immediately reaching settlements.”); 
DEREK SCHMIDT, KAN. ATT’Y GEN., 2012 CONSUMER PROTECTION & ANTITRUST DIVISION ANNUAL 
REPORT 10 (2013), https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/documents/2012-consumer-protection 
-annual-report.pdf?sfvrsn=f90dc91a_6 [https://perma.cc/M437-CJ8Z] (delineating the two different 
actions—one in litigation and one requesting settlement approval).  
 236. Order for Supplemental Briefing at 1–2, Texas v. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc., No. 1:12-cv-
03394 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 29, 2013). 
 237. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-163(b) (2013). 
 238. Id. § 50-164. 
 239. See, e.g., O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien I), 277 P.3d 1062, 1079 
(Kan. 2012) (“[F]ederal precedents interpreting, construing, and applying federal statutes have little 
or no precedential weight when the task is interpretation and application of a clear and dissimilar 
Kansas statute.”). 
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litigation because all parties eventually settled. 
The States reached settlement with all five publishers,240 which 
allowed eBook distributors to reduce the prices of their eBook titles.  After 
entering into settlement agreements with all the defendant publishers, the 
States and the DOJ had a nearly three-week trial against Apple in June 
2013.241  On July 10, 2013, a decision was handed down against Apple, 
which found that Apple had “conspired to restrain trade in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act and relevant state statutes to the extent those 
laws [were] congruent with Section 1.”242  The court also entered an 
injunctive order—which prevented Apple from signing agreements with 
the publishers that restrict ability to set, alter, or reduce the price of 
eBooks—and required Apple to apply the same terms and conditions to 
eBooks sold on its devices and on other applications.243 
Apple appealed the district court decision to the Second Circuit.244  
The trial had been bifurcated, and the district court decision was only as 
to liability.  While the appeal was still pending, Apple and the States 
entered into a rather unique “outcome determinative” settlement 
agreement regarding damages, which hinged on the outcome of the 
appeal.245  There were three possible outcomes: (1) If the liability decision 
was affirmed on any grounds, Apple would pay $400 million for 
nationwide consumer compensation, $20 million to the States, and $30 
million to class counsel; (2) If the liability decision was vacated and 
remanded or reversed and remanded with instructions for reconsideration 
or for retrial, Apple would pay $50 million for nationwide consumer 
compensation, $10 million to the States, and $10 million to class counsel; 
and (3) If the liability decision was reversed in its entirety, Apple would 
pay nothing.246  Kansas agreed to the settlement because it made the most 
sense, both for the State and for Kansas consumers.  The settlement 
represented substantial recovery for consumers, so long as liability was 
upheld, and avoided the need for a damages trial.  There was, of course, a 
 
 240. See United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638, 645 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“[T]he Publisher 
Defendants have settled their claims with both the DOJ and the States.”), aff’d, 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 
2015). 
 241. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Department of Justice Proposes Remedy to Address 
Apple’s Price Fixing (Aug. 2, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/department-justice-proposes 
-remedy-address-apple-s-price-fixing [https://perma.cc/2PS4-5CL9]. 
 242. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d at 709. 
 243. United States v. Apple, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-2826, 2013 WL 4774755, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 
5, 2013). 
 244. See generally United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 245. See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Apple Settlement 
and Distribution Plan at 4–7, Texas v. Penguin Grp. (USA) Inc., No. 12-cv-03394, 2014 WL 9963295 
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2014).   
 246. Id. at 5.  
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risk that the decision would be reversed and the states and consumers 
would be left with nothing, but we were confident in our claims and, 
should the decision have been reversed, nonpayment would have been the 
just and reasonable outcome. 
Two of the publishers appealed the injunction entered by the district 
court because the injunction time period entered against Apple was longer 
than the injunction entered against the publishers.247  The publishers 
argued that the injunction against Apple modified the injunction against 
them.248  A split Second Circuit upheld the district court’s decision and 
injunctive relief.249  Apple appealed the Second Circuit decision against it, 
but its petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court 
was denied.250 
3. Government and Nonprofit Investments 
In 2016, the Attorney General entered into settlements with two 
financial institutions251 pursuant to the same investigation of the municipal 
bond derivative investment industry discussed in Part III.  These later 
settlements were reached in cooperation with private class counsel in In 
Re Municipal Derivatives Antitrust Litigation.252 
In 2012, both the DOJ and the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission settled charges against Barclays PLC, Barclays Bank PLC, 
and Barclays Capital Inc. for attempting to “manipulate and ma[king] false 
reports concerning two global benchmark interest rates,” the London 
Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and the Euro Interbank Offered Rate 
(Euribor).253  State and local governmental and nonprofits, as well as 
institutional and other private entities, use various types of financial 
 
 247. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d at 297.  
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 339. 
 250. United States v. Apple, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1376 (2016).  
 251. These two institutions were Natixis Funding Corp. and Société Générale, S.A.  See Anne 
Steele, Natixis, Société Générale Settle Municipal Bond Fraud Charges, WALL STREET J. (Feb. 24, 
2016, 1:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/natixis-societe-generale-settle-municipal-bond-fraud 
-charges-1456339181 [https://perma.cc/JJ95-9XSJ].  
 252. See Order, In re Municipal Derivatives Antitrust Litig., No. 08-02516 (VM), 2016 WL 
11543257 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2016). 
 253. Press Release, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, CFTC Orders Barclays to Pay $200 
Million Penalty for Attempted Manipulation of and False Reporting Concerning LIBOR and Euribor 
Benchmark Interest Rates (June 27, 2012), https://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr6289 
-12 [https://perma.cc/C3YN-6XYS]; see also  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Barclays Bank 
PLC Admits Misconduct Related to Submissions for the London Interbank Offered Rate and the Euro 
Interbank Offered Rate and Agrees to Pay $160 Million Penalty (June 27, 2012), https:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/barclays-bank-plc-admits-misconduct-related-submissions-london-interbank 
-offered-rate-and [https://perma.cc/SVU3-XH32].  
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instruments in investing and other financial endeavors.  Many of these 
financial instruments contain variable terms that are dependent upon 
LIBOR.254  Such instruments include, but are not limited to, interest rate 
swaps, collateralized debt obligations, floating rate notes, forward rate 
agreements, asset-backed securities, options, structured notes, and 
variable-rate bonds.255  The States opened an investigation.256 
Between 2016 and 2018, the States negotiated and entered into 
settlements with Barclays Bank PLC and Barclays Capital Inc., Deutsche 
Bank Aktiengesellschaft, Citibank, N.A., and UBS AG.257  The 
agreements settled allegations related to “manipulation of certain 
benchmark interest rates, including but not limited to the [LIBOR] and the 
[Euribor], and instruments referencing those rates.”258  Identified state 
governmental and not-for-profit organizations affected by this 
manipulation received restitution payments from the settlements.259 
 
 254. See Staff Statement on LIBOR Transition, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (July 12, 2019), 
https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/libor-transition [https://perma.cc/MXH7-LW56] 
(“LIBOR is an indicative measure of the average interest rate at which major global banks could 
borrow from one another.”); see also London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR), INVESTOR.GOV, 
https://www.investor.gov/introduction-investing/investing-basics/glossary/london-interbank-offered 
-rate-libor [https://perma.cc/2GKH-89NF] (last visited Apr. 6, 2020) (referring to LIBOR as the 
“interest rates banks charge each other for short-term loans” and noting that “LIBOR is frequently 
used as the base for resetting rates on floating-rate securities”). 
 255. See Staff Statement on LIBOR Transition, supra note 254 (“LIBOR is used extensively in the 
U.S. and globally as a ‘benchmark’ or ‘reference rate’ for various commercial and financial contracts, 
including corporate and municipal bonds and loans, floating rate mortgages, asset-backed securities, 
consumer loans, and interest rate swaps and other derivatives.”). 
 256. Matthew Goldstein, Barclays Agrees to Settle Libor-Rigging Inquiry for $100 Million, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/business/dealbook/barclays-agrees-to 
-settle-libor-rigging-inquiry-for-100-million.html [https://perma.cc/7XXP-68CM] (noting that forty-
four states brought an investigation against the British bank and eventually reached a settlement). 
 257. DEREK SCHMIDT, KAN. ATT’Y GEN., 2018 CONSUMER PROTECTION & ANTITRUST DIVISION 
ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2019), https://ag.ks.gov/docs/default-source/reports/consumer/2018-consumer-
report.pdf?sfvrsn=feb1d31a_4 [https://perma.cc/HZJ9-MV3V] (listing the amounts Kansas received 
in each settlement); see also Settlement Agreement Between States and Barclays Bank PLC and 
Barclays Capital Inc. (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.njconsumeraffairs.gov/ocp/Legal%20Filings/0808 
2016-Barclays.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WR7-U597] [hereinafter Barclays Settlement Agreement]; 
Settlement Agreement Between States and UBS AG (Dec. 21, 2018), https://www.attorneygeneral 
.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/2018-12-21-UBS-Settlement-Agreement-Executed.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4UD3-FSBG] [hereinafter UBS AG Settlement Agreement]; Settlement Agreement 
Between States and Citibank, N.A. (June 13, 2018), https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/citi 
_settlement_agreement.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZLL2-S9JD] [hereinafter Citibank Settlement 
Agreement]. 
 258. Barclays Settlement Agreement, supra note 257, at 1 (listing manipulation of both LIBOR 
and Euribor); UBS AG Settlement Agreement, supra note 257, at 1 (noting manipulation of LIBOR); 
Citibank Settlement Agreement, supra note 256, at 1 (noting manipulation of LIBOR).  
 259. Barclays Settlement Agreement, supra note 257, at 10 (providing the details of a 
$100,000,000 settlement); UBS AG Settlement Agreement, supra note 257, at 8 (providing the details 
of a $68,000,000 settlement); Citibank Settlement Agreement, supra note 257, at 8 (providing the 
details of a $100,000,000 settlement); see also Press Release, Office of the Md. Att’y Gen., Attorney 
 
2020] KANSAS ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 909 
4. Mergers 
T-Mobile announced plans to acquire Sprint in 2018.260  After 
investigation, the Attorney General chose to join litigation with the DOJ 
and then settled with the parties for divestiture of assets and build out 
commitments.261  This matter was of particular importance to the State of 
Kansas for many reasons, including that Sprint is one of the largest private 
employers in the state.262  The Attorney General has a unique position 
when it comes to enforcement because he or she must consider a myriad 
of factors when evaluating a merger for antitrust concerns, including the 
effect on Kansas consumers, the economy, and even labor markets.  On 
April 1, 2020, the district court entered the proposed final judgment 
requested by the DOJ and the state attorneys general.263  The merger was 
also challenged by a separate group of states, in the Southern District of 
New York, which considered the settlement inadequate to address 
competitive concerns.264  The New York court refused to block the merger, 
finding the divestiture agreement sufficient to allay competition 
concerns.265 
 
General Frosh Announces $220 Million Settlement with Deutsche Bank for Manipulating LIBOR 
Interest Rate Benchmarks (Oct. 25, 2017), http://www.marylandattorneygeneral.gov/Press/2017 
/102517.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q6CC-MERZ] (“Governmental and not-for-profit entities with LIBOR-
linked swaps and other investment contracts with Barclays (Deutsche Bank) will be notified if they 
are eligible to receive restitution . . . .”).  
 260. T-Mobile and Sprint to Combine, Accelerating 5G Innovation & Increasing Competition, T-
MOBILE (Apr. 29, 2018), https://www.t-mobile.com/news/5gforall [https://perma.cc/D9ME-X2GS]. 
 261. United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-02232 (D.D.C. filed July 26, 2019); 
Proposed Final Judgment and Competitive Impact Statement, United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, 
84 Fed. Reg. 39,862, 39,863 (Aug. 12, 2019) (“On July 26, 2019, the United States, together with the 
State of Kansas, State of Nebraska, State of Ohio, State of Oklahoma and the State of South Dakota, 
filed a Complaint alleging that the proposed acquisition of Sprint Corp. by T-Mobile US, Inc. would 
violate Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. 18.”).  
 262. Top Employers, KAN. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, https://www.kansascommerce.gov/the-kansas 
-edge/learn-about-kansas/top-employers/ [https://perma.cc/VYG9-XMJQ] (last visited Apr. 6, 2020) 
(listing Sprint as the third largest employer in Kansas). 
 263. United States v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-02232-TJK (D.D.C. Apr. 1, 2020); Press 
Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Court Enters Final Judgment in T-Mobile/Sprint Transaction (Apr. 1, 
2020), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/court-enters-final-judgment-t-mobilesprint-transaction 
[https://perma.cc/TCC2-HCS2]. 
 264. Complaint at 2, 4–5, New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-05434 (S.D.N.Y. June 
11, 2019).  
 265. New York v. Deutsche Telekom AG, No. 1:19-cv-05434, 2020 WL 635499 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
11, 2020); Matthew Perlman, T-Mobile, Sprint Beat State-Led Merger Challenge, LAW360 (Feb. 11, 
2020, 8:54 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1242797/t-mobile-sprint-beat-state-led-merger 
-challenge. 
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5. Technological Services 
Many consider the technology industry the “next frontier” of antitrust 
enforcement.266  Big players include Google, Facebook, and other large 
providers of internet based services.267  Although it is unusual for the 
Attorney General to announce an investigation, Kansas, along with other 
investigating states, has taken the unusual step of announcing its 
participation in investigations in this area due to “heightened public 
scrutiny and policy discussions surrounding the business practices” of 
major technology companies.268  Allegations surrounding big tech 
companies include putting consumer data at risk, reducing consumer 
choice, increasing the price of advertising, blocking access to platforms, 
and other anticompetitive behaviors.269  Because these matters are 
currently under confidential investigation, no more can be said specifically 
about them. 
B. Private Kansas Antitrust Litigation: 2013–2019 
1. Kansas Court of Appeals Decisions 
The Kansas Supreme Court has not issued a KRTA opinion since the 
2013 amendments were enacted.270  Three cases have been decided by the 
Kansas Court of Appeals since 2013, but only one was designated for 
publication, Smith v. Philip Morris Cos.271  That matter was decided after 
 
 266. See, e.g., David Smith, A New Antitrust Frontier—The Issue Closing Partisan Divides in the 
Name of Policing Big Tech, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 3 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.theguardian 
.com/us-news/2019/feb/02/a-new-antitrust-frontier-the-issue-closing-partisan-divides-in-the-name-of 
-policing-big-tech [https://perma.cc/J6AR-MA9V]; Jack Nicas et al., How Each Big Tech Company 
May Be Targeted by Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/08 
/technology/antitrust-amazon-apple-facebook-google.html [https://perma.cc/QAQ4-2WP4].  
 267. Nicas et al., supra note 266.  
 268. Press Release, Derek Schmidt, Kan. Att’y Gen., AG Derek Schmidt: Kansas Part of 
Multistate Investigation into Google Business Practices (Sept. 9, 2019), https://ag.ks.gov 
/media-center/news-releases/2019/09/09/ag-derek-schmidt-kansas-part-of-multistate-investigation-
into-google-business-practices [https://perma.cc/SR7J-DPML]. 
 269. Press Release, Letitia James, N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Gives Update On 
Facebook Antitrust Investigation (Oct. 22, 2019), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2019/attorney 
-general-james-gives-update-facebook-antitrust-investigation [https://perma.cc/C9N8-G5KP]; Press 
Release, Ken Paxton, Tex. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Paxton Leads 50 Attorneys General in Google 
Multistate Bipartisan Antitrust Investigation (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov 
/news/releases/attorney-general-paxton-leads-50-attorneys-general-google-multistate-bipartisan-anti 
trust [https://perma.cc/CUZ5-8EGQ].   
 270. The last Kansas Supreme Court opinion regarding the KRTA was issued on August 31, 2012.  
Seaboard Corp. v. Marsh Inc., 284 P.3d 314, 317 (Kan. 2012). 
 271. 335 P.3d 644 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014); O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien 
II), No. 108,988, 2014 WL 1362657 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2014); Idstrom v. All. Radiology, P.A., 
No. 115,099, 2017 WL 129926 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 13, 2017). 
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the 2013 legislative change; however, the original complaint was filed 
prior to the statute change, which did not apply retroactively to cases 
already pending.272  Therefore, the court ruled on the matter pursuant to 
the 2000 version of the KRTA, finding that federal antitrust law 
interpretations can be persuasive authority, but only to the extent they “do 
not conflict with clearly dissimilar provisions in the KRTA.”273 
The Smith case was brought as a class action on behalf of Kansas 
retailers, alleging a conspiracy among tobacco manufacturers to “fix the 
wholesale price of cigarettes in violation of the Kansas Restraint of Trade 
Act.”274  The defendants won summary judgment at the lower court.275  
One of the key issues on appeal was a legal theory that had never been 
discussed by Kansas courts: conscious parallelism.276  Conscious 
parallelism can emerge in any market with a limited number of players and 
is not in and of itself unlawful.277  It happens when companies in a market 
set their prices at the same, often supracompetitive, level in a “consciously 
parallel fashion.”278  The companies might be mutually aware of their 
parallel pricing but if the decision is made independently, it is legal.279  The 
situation can become illegal if the companies come to an agreement or 
understanding to fix prices.280  When, as in this case, evidence of conscious 
parallelism is present, courts must ensure that lawful, unilateral conduct is 
not punished—something more is required.281  The appellate court noted 
that the Kansas Supreme Court, in O’Brien I, found the KRTA demanded 
“something more than merely a unilateral pricing policy.”282  In this 
instance, federal and state law share language, “between persons,” so the 
Kansas Supreme Court looks to “United States Supreme Court precedent 
for assistance.”283  The Smith court found that requiring the plaintiff to 
show more than unilateral pricing activity—plus factors—to withstand 
summary judgment was consistent with state law.284 
 
 272. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-164 (2013); Smith, 335 P.3d at 652–53. 
 273. Smith, 335 P.3d at 653.  
 274. Id. at 650.  
 275. Id. at 650–51.  
 276. Id. at 663–64. 
 277. Id. (quoting In re Baby Food Antitrust Litig., 166 F.3d 112, 121–22 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 278. Id.  
 279. Id.  
 280. Id. at 664.  
 281. Id. at 664, 666 (“[R]easonable minds cannot infer that price-fixing is afoot merely from 
conscious parallel pricing conduct of oligopolists.  Something more must be shown to establish a 
reasonable inference that such competitors acted in concert.” (emphasis added)). 
 282. Id. at 665 (quoting O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien I), 277 P.3d 
1062, 1087 (Kan. 2012)). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 666.  
912 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 68 
The Idstrom case, decided in 2017, involved a dispute by a terminated 
shareholder against his medical group and former partners.285  The plaintiff 
had multiple allegations of wrongdoing, including a violation of the 
KRTA.  The jury in the district court found the medical group had not 
violated the KRTA but that his partners had breached fiduciary duties 
owed to him.286  Although the jury found there was a civil conspiracy, it 
found that the medical group was not a trust pursuant to the KRTA.287  The 
court found that plaintiff was required to prove that the medical group was 
a trust before he could recover damages from the shareholders pursuant to 
the KRTA.288 
The O’Brien I decision was appealed a second time in 2014; this time 
to the Kansas Court of Appeals (O’Brien II).289  The court commented on 
whether the KRTA applies retroactively and O’Brien I’s precedential 
value: 
In direct response to the Kansas Supreme Court’s earlier decision in this 
case, the Kansas Legislature made significant amendments to the Kansas 
Restraint of Trade Act, effective April 18, 2013 . . . .  [T]he legislature 
declared that its new provision allowing reasonable restraint of trade 
should apply retroactively except for cases, like this one, that were 
pending before April 18, 2013. 
 The end result is that most of O’Brien’s precedential value is limited 
to this case and any other case that was already pending before April 18, 
2013.  Accordingly, our opinion in this case will have very limited 
precedential value going forward regarding issues arising under the 
Kansas Restraint of Trade Act. . . .290 
The issue on appeal was the lower court’s decision to modify the class, 
which the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, finding the 
lower court had failed to perform a rigorous analysis of class certification 
factors or to acknowledge that more than one antitrust statute provided a 
basis for class recovery.291  Because, as the court clearly acknowledged, 
the statutes examined in the opinion were repealed by the 2013 
amendment, we will not delve into the case further.292 
 
 285. Idstrom v. All. Radiology, P.A., No. 115,099, 2017 WL 129926, at *1 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 
13, 2017). 
 286. Id.  
 287. Id. at *9–10.  
 288. Id.   
 289. O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien II), No. 108,988, 2014 WL 1362657 
(Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2014). 
 290. Id. at *5 (citations omitted). 
 291. Id. at *13. 
 292. Id. at *5; S.B. 124, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013). 
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2. U.S. Supreme Court Decisions 
Only one United States Supreme Court case has addressed the KRTA 
in the past twenty years, Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.293  Although there is 
not a detailed discussion of Kansas law specifically, the finding of the 
Court affirmed that Kansas antitrust law was not preempted by the federal 
Natural Gas Act.294  A group of end-user purchasers in several states 
bought natural gas directly from interstate pipelines.295  They brought state 
and federal lawsuits suing those pipelines over claims that they had 
engaged in anticompetitive conduct that caused them to pay higher 
prices.296  The conduct engaged in affected both wholesale and resale 
pricing.297  The state lawsuits were removed to federal district court and 
consolidated.298  The district court found that the purchasers’ claims were 
preempted by the Natural Gas Act.299  The purchasers appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit which reversed the decision.300  The Ninth Circuit 
interpreted the “Natural Gas Act’s pre-emptive scope narrowly in light of 
Congress’ intent—manifested in § 1(b) of the Act—to preserve for the 
States the authority to regulate non-jurisdictional sales.”301 
The pipelines then appealed to the Supreme Court.  The State of 
Kansas drafted and filed an amicus brief, which twenty other state 
attorneys general joined, arguing that the Supreme Court should respect 
the “dual federal and state regulation that Congress has carefully respected 
and preserved in this context” and affirm the Ninth Circuit holding.302  The 
amicus brief reaffirmed that state antitrust powers are within the traditional 
police powers of the States and federal acts do not displace them absent 
actual conflict between the two.303  In this matter, Congress “was 
meticulous to take in only territory which this Court had held the States 
could not reach.”304  Thus, the States argued the Court should “maintain 
and continue to enforce the longstanding line” both the Natural Gas Act 
 
 293. 575 U.S. 373 (2015).  
 294. Id. at 390.  
 295. Id. at 376.  
 296. Id. at 376, 384. 
 297. Id. at 373. 
 298. Id. at 383. 
 299. Id.  
 300. Id.  
 301. Id. at 383–84. 
 302. Brief of the State of Kansas and Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
3, Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015) (No. 13-271), 2014 WL 6766369. 
 303. Id. at 5.   
 304. Id. (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Ind., 332 U.S. 507, 519 
(1947)). 
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itself and the Court had “recognized between federal and state regulatory 
power.”305  The Kansas Attorney General’s Office was granted ten minutes 
to defend this position at oral argument on January 12, 2015.306 
The majority found that the Court had repeatedly stressed that the 
Natural Gas Act “was drawn with meticulous regard for the continued 
exercise of state power, not to handicap or dilute it in any way.”307  The 
Court ruled that the aim of state regulation determined whether it was 
preempted rather than the effect, and antitrust laws are not aimed at any 
particular company, but “all businesses in the marketplace.”308  Because 
of the broad applicability of state antitrust law, the Court determined that 
no preemption should be found.309 
3. Tenth Circuit Decision 
Suture Express, Inc. v. Owens & Minor Distribution, Inc., the only 
Tenth Circuit case to consider the KRTA in the past nineteen years, 
involved allegations of illegal tying arrangements under both federal 
antitrust law and the KRTA.310  The district court granted summary 
judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed.311  
The KRTA is discussed in a small subsection, with the remainder devoted 
to discussion of federal antitrust law.  The court observed that (1) Kansas 
law is not the same as its federal counterparts, and (2) though it was 
originally enacted over a century ago, the KRTA “remains largely 
undeveloped.”312  The court found the plaintiff failed to carry its burden of 
proving a viable antitrust injury or to show that defendants intended to 
prevent full and free competition.313  The court undertook no discussion of 
the 2013 legislative amendment of the KRTA.314 
 
 305. Id. at 16–17.   
 306. Oneok, Inc. et al. v. Learjet, Inc. et al.: Oral Argument - January 12, 2015, OYEZ, 
https://www.oyez.org/cases/2014/13-271 [https://perma.cc/5KDJ-GBHH] (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) 
(select “Oral Argument – January 12, 2015” under “Oral Argument”). 
 307. Oneok, 573 U.S. at 384–85 (quoting Panhandle, 332 U.S. at 517–18). 
 308. Id. at 387. 
 309. Id. at 389–90. 
 310. 851 F.3d 1029, 1036–37 (10th Cir. 2017).  One other Tenth Circuit case mentions the KRTA; 
however, the court noted that the party abandoned the claim and there was no further discussion of the 
Act.  Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Pittsburg, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 431 F.3d 1241, 1255 n.6 (10th Cir. 
2005), amended on reh’g in part (Apr. 11, 2006). 
 311. Suture Express, 851 F.3d at 1033–34. 
 312. Id. at 1046 (quoting O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien I), 277 P.3d 
1062, 1068 (Kan. 2012)). 
 313. Id.  
 314. The original complaint in this action was filed on December 5, 2012, prior to amendment of 
the KRTA.  See Complaint, Suture Express, Inc. v. Cardinal Health, Inc., 963 F. Supp. 2d 1212 (D. 
Kan. 2012) (No. 12 Civ. 2760 RDR/KGS), 2012 WL 6049685. 
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4. District of Kansas Decisions 
The Federal District of Kansas has considered by far the most KRTA 
cases since the 2013 amendment of the KRTA.  The most recently decided 
District of Kansas case, Reorganized FLI, Inc. v. Williams Cos., dealt with 
the retroactivity of the 2013 amendment to the KRTA damages 
provisions.315  The plaintiff filed suit in 2005 seeking full consideration 
damages, or a full refund of its natural gas purchases, under K.S.A. § 50-
115, a statute that was repealed in 2013.316  The court noted that although 
the legislature enacted a savings statute that states “non-remedial 
provisions . . . shall be applied prospectively,” it does not explicitly 
address K.S.A. § 50-115.317  However, the court acknowledged the 
O’Brien I court’s conclusion that “if a party’s cause of action arose under 
[K.S.A.] § 50-112, the relief came from [K.S.A.] § [50]-115.”318  
Therefore, to apply the statutory change retroactively would eliminate the 
plaintiff’s damages and thus its cause of action, which would be contrary 
to the savings statute.319 
The court also discussed two Kansas Court of Appeals decisions, 
O’Brien II and Smith, which both made broad statements that the KRTA 
amendments do not apply to cases that were pending at the time the 
amendments were enacted.320  Neither case specifically addresses the 
retroactivity of § 50-115.  In O’Brien II, the Kansas Court of Appeals 
noted the changes in the KRTA, and that those changes were enacted in 
direct response to the Kansas Supreme Court’s earlier opinion in the 
case.321  The court noted the repeal of full consideration damages as well 
as other changes to the KRTA.322  The Kansas Court of Appeals noted that 
most of the precedential value from its opinion and the Kansas Supreme 
Court’s earlier O’Brien I decision was limited to cases already pending 
prior to April 18, 2013.323 
The O’Brien II court considered and discussed whether the district 
 
 315. Reorganized FLI, Inc. v. Williams Cos., 410 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1216 (D. Kan. 2019), 
reconsideration denied, motion to certify appeal granted, No. 05-CV-02389, 2019 WL 6998756 (D. 
Kan. Dec. 20, 2019). 
 316. Id.  
 317. Id. at 1219. 
 318. Id. at 1221 (citing O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Prods., Inc. (O’Brien I), 277 P.3d 1062, 1074 
(Kan. 2012)).  
 319. Id.  
 320. Id. at 1219–20 (citing O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien II), No. 
108,988, 2014 WL 1362657 (Kan. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2014); Smith v. Phillip Morris Cos., 335 P.3d 644 
(Kan. Ct. App. 2014)).   
 321. O’Brien II, 2014 WL 1362657, at *5. 
 322. Id.  
 323. Id.  
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court improperly modified the class by excluding class members.324  In 
making this decision, the Kansas Court of Appeals discussed legal 
propositions based on K.S.A. § 50-115 and K.S.A § 50-108, two of the 
three damages provisions in the KRTA.325  Although the court did not 
discuss whether full consideration damages under K.S.A. § 50-115 
remained applicable in cases that were pending at the time of the KRTA 
amendments, the Kansas Court of Appeals’ decision implied that a claim 
under K.S.A. § 50-115 was still viable.326 
In Smith v. Philip Morris Cos., the Kansas Court of Appeals noted that 
the Kansas legislature made substantial changes to the KRTA in 2013.327  
The court noted the effective date of those changes but also specifically 
stated that they “do not apply retroactively to cases, like this one, already 
pending at the time.”328  The Kansas Court of Appeals stated that the 
legislature repealed the full consideration damages.329  The court also 
stated that the plaintiffs claimed full consideration damages and that it 
would proceed under the previous version of the KRTA because the case 
was pending at the time of the amendments.330  The court did not explicitly 
state that full consideration damages were no longer available.  After 
reviewing O’Brien II and Smith in depth and negating out-of-state 
decisions and a district court decision that preceded these Kansas Court of 
Appeals cases, the court in Reorganized FLI found the savings statute does 
not clearly provide that the repeal of K.S.A. § 50-115 should be applied 
retroactively and denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.331 
In re EpiPen was a class action alleging violations of federal law, 
including the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act 
(RICO), state antitrust laws, state consumer protection laws, and unjust 
enrichment against the manufacturer and seller of epinephrine auto-
injector devices.332  The majority of the decision discusses federal law 
issues and then specifically addresses alleged deficiencies in state law 
pleadings.  The KRTA claims were dismissed because the KRTA does not 
recognize unilateral conduct claims; a combination or conspiracy is 
 
 324. Id. at *10–13. 
 325. Id. at *7–9. 
 326. Id.  
 327. 335 P.3d 644, 652 (Kan. Ct. App. 2014). 
 328. Id.  
 329. Id.  
 330. Id. at 652–53. 
 331. Reorganized FLI, Inc. v. Williams Cos., 410 F. Supp. 3d 1213, 1216 (D. Kan.), 
reconsideration denied, motion to certify appeal granted, No. 05-CV-02389, 2019 WL 6998756 (D. 
Kan. Dec. 20, 2019). 
 332. In re EpiPen (Epinephrine Injection, USP) Mktg., Sales Practices & Antitrust Litig., 336 F. 
Supp. 3d 1256, 1275–76 (D. Kan. 2018). 
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required.333 
In the Digital Ally, Inc. v. Taser International, Inc., the plaintiff 
accused the defendant of bribing municipalities to purchase law 
enforcement body cameras, denying it market access in violation of federal 
and state antitrust law.334  The defendant claimed it was entitled to federal 
Noerr-Pennington immunity and the court agreed, granting its motion to 
dismiss.335  Because the KRTA is to “be construed in harmony with ruling 
judicial interpretations of federal antitrust law by the United States 
Supreme Court,” the court found its federal law decision was dispositive 
to the Kansas claims as well.336 
Another District of Kansas decision discussing the KRTA is a decision 
which was appealed to the Tenth Circuit, Suture Express, Inc. v. Owens & 
Minor Distribution, Inc.337  Suture Express alleged the defendants engaged 
in “tying and bundling the sale of suture and endomechanical” products to 
the sale of other medical-surgical distribution products.338  Both parties 
moved for summary judgment.339  The court acknowledged that while the 
KRTA and federal antitrust laws are similar, they are not the same.340  
Relying on the O’Brien I decision, the court found it could not simply 
apply its federal analysis to the Kansas claim, but had to begin its analysis 
with antitrust injury.341  The court undertook a careful reading of O’Brien 
I and found that in light of declining prices and markets, the plaintiff could 
not prove antitrust injury or damages causation.342  The court also found 
 
 333. Id. at 1313–14. 
 334. No. 16-2032, 2017 WL 131595, at *1 (D. Kan. Jan. 12, 2017), aff’d, 720 F. App’x 1023 (Fed. 
Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 231 (2018).  
 335. Id.  The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine is based on a U.S. Supreme Court case, City of Columbia 
v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., which held that “federal antitrust laws do not regulate the conduct 
of private individuals in seeking anticompetitive action from the government.”  499 U.S. 365, 379–80 
(1991).  This doctrine “exempts from antitrust liability any legitimate use of the political process by 
private individuals, even if their intent is to eliminate competition.”  Digital Ally, Inc., 2017 WL 
131595, at *1 (quoting Zimomra v. Alamo Rent-A-Car, Inc., 111 F.3d 1495, 1503 (10th Cir. 1997)). 
 336. Digital Ally, Inc., 2017 WL 131595, at *2 (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-163(b) (2013)).  
 337. No. 12-2760, 2016 WL 1377342 (D. Kan. Apr. 7, 2016), aff’d, 851 F.3d 1029 (10th Cir. 
2017).  The plaintiff previously survived a motion to dismiss its KRTA claims.  Suture Express, Inc. 
v. Cardinal Health 200, LLC, 963 F. Supp. 2d 1212, 1231 (D. Kan. 2013).  The court found, inter alia, 
that the plaintiff had stated a sufficient KRTA claim to withstand dismissing because:  
[T]he general rule [in Kansas] appears to be that a complaint need not point to the 
appropriate statute or law in order to raise a claim for relief; a complaint may sufficiently 
raise a claim even if it points to no legal theory or even if it points to the wrong legal theory 
as a basis for that claim. 
Id. at 1229 (citations omitted). 
 338. Suture Express, 2016 WL 1377342, at *1.  
 339. Id.  
 340. Id. at *33. 
 341. Id. at *33–34. 
 342. Id. at *33–35.  
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that the plaintiff couldn’t prove that the contracts were intended to prevent 
competition. 343 
Finally, in Catron v. Colt Energy, Inc., Catron brought a class action 
in state court, alleging mineral leasing companies were allocating markets 
instead of competing.344  The defendants removed the case to federal court, 
pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act,345 and then moved to dismiss.346  
The court found that Catron had sufficiently pled a KRTA violation,347 but 
that he could not recover full consideration damages under the plain 
language of the statute which specifically discussed a remedy for buyers 
who had paid a sum; the plaintiff was a lessor, who was paid for the use 
of his property.348  Therefore, he could not recover full consideration 
damages.349  Other claims survived and the case was later remanded to 
state court.350 
VI. A CONTINUED ROLE FOR STATE ANTITRUST IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
Some might question the need for state antitrust laws when there are 
federal laws, or the need for Attorney General enforcement when there are 
private actions, but there are many reasons Kansas antitrust law and 
actions by the Kansas Attorney General are important.  For example, 
Kansas antitrust law specifically protects Kansans.  While many antitrust 
issues in today’s global society have a national or international effect, 
some anticompetitive actions are still limited to a small geographic area.  
Or, even if it has a broad effect, the action may have a particularly 
detrimental effect on a small localized area.  That is where Kansas antitrust 
law, as well as the enforcement authority of the Kansas Attorney General, 
are particularly important.  Even in multistate cases brought in federal 
court, Kansas legal authority and the involvement of the Kansas Attorney 




 343. Id. at *35. 
 344. No. 13-4073, 2014 WL 7246804, at *1 (D. Kan. Dec. 17, 2014). 
 345. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2012); Catron, 2014 WL 7246804, at *1. 
 346. Catron, 2014 WL 7246804, at *1. 
 347. Id. at *3.  
 348. Id. at *4.  
 349. Id.  Catron sought full consideration damages under KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-115 (2000), which 
was repealed in its entirety in 2013.  S.B. 124, 85th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Kan. 2013). 
 350. Catron v. Colt Energy, Inc., No. 13-4073, 2015 WL 3967007, at *2 (D. Kan. June 30, 2015). 
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A. Not Preempted by Federal Law 
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution provides that federal law is 
the “supreme Law of the Land,”351 And the Tenth Amendment designates 
that “powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor 
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to 
the people.”352  State antitrust laws are not preempted by federal antitrust 
laws.  Rather “Congress intended the federal antitrust laws to supplement, 
not displace, state antitrust remedies.”353  State antitrust laws have also 
been upheld in the face of other federal enforcement.  One example is the 
U.S. Supreme Court case Oneok v. Learjet discussed previously.354  One 
of the arguments made by the State in its amicus filing was that the 
harmonization requirement in the KRTA and other states’ antitrust laws is 
evidence that state antitrust laws are consistent with the goals and purposes 
of federal antitrust laws.355  In Oneok, the Court affirmed that “[s]tates 
have a long history of providing common-law and statutory remedies 
against monopolies and unfair business practices” and have a “long-
recognized power to regulate combinations in restraint of trade.”356 
B. The Attorney General’s Role in Antitrust Enforcement 
The Attorney General continues to have an important and unique role 
in Kansas antitrust enforcement.  The Attorney General has a duty to 
enforce the KRTA and is given authority to seek damages on behalf of 
state and municipal entities357 as well as the harmed members of the 
public.358  The statutes and case law grant the Attorney General special 
enforcement privileges unavailable to private litigants, and the Attorney 
General has the right to sue on behalf of the general public for the common 
welfare of Kansas.359  Attorney General enforcement of the KRTA results 
in a general benefit reaped by the public due to this special authority.  The 
Attorney General also has a statutory duty to enforce the KRTA,360 which 
 
 351. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 352. Id. amend. X. 
 353. California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 102 (1989) (citing 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890) 
(remarks of Senator Sherman)). 
 354. See supra notes 293–309 and accompanying text.  
 355. Brief of the State of Kansas and Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 
16, Oneok, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 575 U.S. 373 (2015) (No. 13-271), 2014 WL 6766369, at *16.  
 356. Oneok, Inc., 575 U.S. at 388 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 357. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-162 (2013). 
 358. Id. § 50-103(a)(8). 
 359. Id. § 50-162. 
 360. Id. § 50-109(a). 
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he or she accomplishes in part by investigating allegations of wrongdoing, 
educating the public, and filing lawsuits, comments, and amicus briefs as 
needed. 
1. Statute of Limitations 
A private litigant suing under the KRTA is subject to a three-year 
statute of limitations on claims for damages.361  In contrast, an action 
brought by the Attorney General, in his or her official capacity and 
exercising statutory authority conferred upon him or her is not subject to 
a statute of limitations because he or she is performing a governmental 
function.362  The Attorney General therefore is not bound to the three-year 
statute of limitation that binds private litigants and can take action against 
statutory violators regardless of when the violation occurred.  While a 
private litigant is allowed to act as a “private attorney[] general” in 
enforcing the statute on their own behalf, “the Attorney General is 
explicitly empowered to seek civil penalties to punish a violation on behalf 
of the rest of the citizens of the state.”363 
2. Harm to the State 
The Attorney General is uniquely situated to bring claims for harm on 
behalf of the State, its agencies and political subdivisions—both by a 
specific grant of authority in the KRTA364 and in his or her position as the 
chief law enforcement officer of the State.365  The Attorney General can 
institute an action “on behalf of the State of Kansas or of any city, town, 
or political subdivision, or other governmental agency, body or authority 
established under the law of the state of Kansas,” and can also intervene 
in any action or proceeding on behalf of the same.366  It is typically far 
more efficient for the Attorney General to act on behalf of affected 
governmental entities in one proceeding than for multiple actions to 
proceed, which may result in differing, contradictory rulings. 
 
 361. Seaboard Corp. v. Marsh Inc., 284 P.3d 314, 317 (Kan. 2012) (citing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-
512(2)). 
 362. See State ex rel. Stephan v. Brotherhood Bank & Tr. Co., 649 P.2d 419, 423–24 (Kan. 1982). 
 363. O’Brien v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. (O’Brien I), 277 P.3d 1062, 1086 (Kan. 2012) 
(citing KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50-103(a)(5), -160). 
 364. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-162. 
 365. Id. § 75-764(a); see also id. § 75-702 (2013) (“The attorney general shall appear for the state, 
and prosecute and defend any and all actions and proceedings, civil or criminal, in the Kansas supreme 
court, the Kansas court of appeals and in all federal courts, in which the state shall be interested or a 
party, and shall, when so appearing, control the state’s prosecution or defense.”). 
 366. Id. § 50-162. 
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3. Citizens and Parens Patriae 
The Attorney General also has authority to bring actions to recover on 
behalf of the State’s citizens.  It is one of the enumerated powers of the 
Attorney General under the KRTA.367  At least one court has described 
this grant of authority as the functional equivalent of a related authority 
known as parens patriae, which allows the Attorney General to bring 
claims on behalf of Kansas citizens.368  In Kansas cases, parens patriae is 
most commonly discussed in relation to juvenile offenses, child custody, 
and state commitments.  Given that “parens patriae” literally translates as 
“parent of the country”369 this should come as no surprise.  In the antitrust 
and similar legal contexts where the rights of citizens are affected, parens 
patriae is a quasi-sovereign interest that is asserted by the State on behalf 
of its citizens.370  The Attorney General is the only party authorized to 
bring a parens patriae claim on behalf of the State and its citizens371 and 
such claims can be asserted under both state and federal law.372 The U.S. 
Supreme Court has found that States have a constitutional power373 to 
bring parens lawsuits. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Kansas has a rich antitrust history, dating back over a century, which 
continues to develop today as we enter the third decade of the twenty-first 
century.  The Kansas antitrust laws began with much vigor and movement, 
then little major amendment occurred from 1923 to 2000.  Following that, 
the KRTA was amended twice in thirteen years.  It remains to be seen 
 
 367. Id. § 50-103(a)(8). 
 368. In re Lorazepam & Clorazepate Antitrust Litig., 205 F.R.D. 369, 386 (D.D.C. 2002) (citing 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-103(a)(8)). 
 369. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 600 (1982) (citation 
omitted). 
 370. Id. at 607; see also Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, State’s Standing to Sue on Behalf of 
Its Citizens, 42 A.L.R. Fed. 23 § 2(a) (1979) (“[A] state has standing to maintain on behalf of its 
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whether the KRTA will remain in its current form for another eighty years 
or if further legislative action will occur.  What we know for sure is the 
Attorney General, the private litigant, the legislature, and the courts all 
have important roles to play in shaping the development and trajectory of 
antitrust enforcement in the years to come. 
